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Abstract
Supply chain management is commonly employed by businesses to improve organiza-
tional processes by optimizing the transfer of goods, information, and services between
buyers and suppliers. Traditionally, supply chains have been created and maintained
through the interactions of human representatives of the various companies involved.
However, the recent advent of autonomous software agents opens new possibilities
for automating and coordinating the decision making processes between the various
parties involved.
Autonomous agents participating in supply chain management must typically make
their decisions in environments of high complexity, high variability, and high uncer-
tainty since only limited information is visible.
We present an approach whereby an autonomous agent is able to make tactical de-
cisions, such as product pricing, as well as strategic decisions, such as product mix
and production planning, in order to maximize its profit despite the uncertainties in
the market. The agent predicts future market conditions and adapts its decisions on
procurement, production, and sales accordingly.
Using a combination of machine learning and optimization techniques, the agent first
characterizes the microeconomic conditions, such as over-supply or scarcity, of the
market. These conditions are distinguishable statistical patterns that we call economic
regimes. They are learned from historical data by using a Gaussian Mixture Model to
model the price density of the different products and by clustering price distributions
that recur across days.
In real-time the agent identifies the current dominant market condition and forecasts
market changes over a planning horizon. Methods for the identification of regimes
are explored in detail, and three different algorithms are presented. One is based on
exponential smoothing, the second on a Markov prediction process, and the third on
a Markov correction-prediction process. We examine a wide range of tuning options
for these algorithms, and show how they can be used to predict prices, price trends,
and the probability of receiving a customer order.
We validate our methods by presenting experimental results from the Trading Agent
Competition for Supply Chain Management, an international competition of software
vii
agents that has provided inspiration for this work. We also show how the same
approach can be applied to the stock market.
viii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Business organizations have an increasing need for software that can assist decision
makers by gathering and analyzing information, making recommendations, and sup-
porting business decisions. Advanced decision support systems and autonomous soft-
ware agents promise to address this need by acting rationally on behalf of humans
in numerous application domains. Examples include procurement [Sandholm, 2006,
CombineNet, 2006], scheduling and resource management [I2, 2006, Collins et al.,
2001], and personal information management [Berry et al., 2006, Mark and Perrault,
2006].
1.1 Objective
In this thesis, we show how machine learning techniques can be used to support ra-
tional decision making by an autonomous agent that operates in a market for durable
goods to sell products. We are particularly interested in environments that are con-
strained by capacity and materials availability. We demonstrate our approach in the
context of an autonomous agent that is designed to compete in the Trading Agent
Competition for Supply Chain Management (TAC SCM) [Collins et al., 2005].
Our method characterizes market conditions by distinguishable statistical patterns,
that we call economic regimes. We show how such patterns can be learned from
historical data and subsequently identified in real time from observable data. We
describe how to identify regimes and to forecast regime transitions. This prediction,
in turn, can be used by the agent to allocate resources to current and future sales
1
in a way that maximizes resource value. While this type of prediction about the
economic environment is commonly used at the macro economic level [Osborn and
Sensier, 2002], such predictions are rarely done for micro-economic environments.
1.2 Agents for Electronic Marketplaces
What is an agent? The term “Agent” has been used in a rather vague way in industry
and academic literature. According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary,
an agent is “one that acts or exerts power... a means or instrument by which a guiding
intelligence achieves a result... one that acts for or in the place of another by authority
from him.” Russell and Norvig [Russell and Norvig, 2002] say that “An agent is just
something that acts (agent comes from the Latin agere, to do)”. Bradshaw [Bradshaw,
1997] reviews in detail the various meanings of the term as it has been used in the
research community.
The meaning we use focuses primarily on the “agency” and “intelligence” dimensions
as used by Bradshaw. By “agency”, we refer to the notion that agents have persistent
existence and identity within an environment in which they can perceive, act, and
observe the effects of their actions. By “intelligence”, we mean that the agents are
rational to the limits of their computational capabilities. We use the term “rational”
in the decision-theoretic sense to mean that an agent acts to maximize its own utility.
As an example, a TAC SCM agent exists in a market environment where it competes
with other agents, and its utility is measured in economic terms.
TAC SCM agents can be characterized as autonomous, self-interested, and hetero-
geneous. They are “autonomous”, in the sense that once a game starts there is no
human intervention. This means that they are not directed by commands coming
from a user (or another agent), but by a set of utility and learning functions, which
can take the form of individual goals to be achieved. They are “self-interested” in
that they are expected to behave in a way that maximizes their own utility, without
regard to the utilities of other agents or of the society as a whole. They are “het-
erogeneous” in the sense that agents differ in their capacities, and in general must
find other agents to supply the resources they need to satisfy their own goals. A
second type of heterogeneity is that agents of the same type are often implemented
in different ways. In TAC SCM each team provides its own agent which complies
with the rules of the market, but internally runs different algorithms to achieve the
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external goal as its competitors.
1.3 Motivating examples
To make the ideas more clear, here are several example scenarios from different in-
dustries where our proposed approach could be applied if the vision behind economic
regimes were to be further developed and commercialized.
Supply-chain management –
In TAC SCM [Collins et al., 2005], each of the competing agents plays the part
of a manufacturer of personal computers. Agents compete with each other in
the procurement market where they buy computer components, and in the sales
market where they sell finished computers. Each game runs for 220 simulated
days, which take approximatively an hour of real time. Each agent starts with
no inventory and an empty bank account, and so must borrow money (and
pay interest on it) to build up an initial parts inventory before it can begin
assembling and selling computers. The agent with the largest bank account at
the end of the game is the winner.
Other examples where agents are used in supply-chain management include pro-
curement [Sandholm, 2006, CombineNet, 2006], scheduling and resource man-
agement [I2, 2006, Collins et al., 2001], and personal information management
[Berry et al., 2006, Mark and Perrault, 2006].
Financial markets – The Penn-Lehman Automated Trading Project [Kearns and
Ortiz, 2003] is a broad investigation of algorithms and strategies for automated
trading in financial markets and related environments. The project makes use
of the Penn Exchange Simulator, a simulator for automated trading that uses
real-world, real-time stock market data.
Auction-based contracting – The MAGNET [Collins et al., 2002a] automated
contracting environment is designed to support negotiation among multiple,
heterogeneous, self-interested agents over the distributed execution of complex
tasks that have time and precedence constraints. MAGNET is highly config-
urable and extensible, and has been used for several statistical studies aimed at
understanding the decision processes for a Customer agent.
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Travel arrangements – In the TAC classic game [Wellman et al., 2001], each agent
is a travel agent, with the goal of assembling travel packages from TACtown
to Tampa, during a notional 5-day period for its clients. Each agent acts on
behalf of eight clients, who express their preferences for various aspects (hotel,
entertainment, etc) of the trip. The objective of the travel agent is to maximize
the total satisfaction of its clients (i.e. the sum of the client utilities).
1.4 Contributions
The key contributions of this dissertation are:
1. We present a mathematical formulation of an economic regime. Economic
regimes are microeconomic conditions, such as over-supply or scarcity, of a
market. Regimes are learned from historical data by using a Gaussian Mixture
Model to model the price density of the different products and by clustering
price distributions that recur across days. An innovative aspect of our work is
that we treat economic regimes at the micro-economic level. So far the existence
of regimes has only been reported at the macro-economic level.
2. We develop methods for dynamic identification of regimes and for prediction of
regime distribution over a planning horizon. We present three different algo-
rithms (plus an additional one in the Appendix). The first is based on expo-
nential smoothing, the second on a Markov prediction process, and the third
on a Markov correction-prediction process. We examine a wide range of tuning
options for these algorithms, and show how they can be used to predict prices,
price trends, and the probability of receiving a customer order.
3. We present principles and algorithms for tactical decision making, such as calcu-
lation of customer offer prices, for strategic decision making, such as allocation
of products over the planning horizon, and for market manipulation. We show
how knowledge of the current and future regime distribution facilitates tactical
and strategical decision making by the agent.
4. We demonstrate the value of prediction within supply-chain environments, and
how predictions impact all aspects of the supply-chain, such as procurement
and production. We also demonstrate that the identification and prediction of
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economic regimes is valuable outside of supply-chain management domain, such
as for financial markets.
Our proposed method has the advantage that it works in any market for durable
goods, since the computational process is completely data driven and no classifica-
tion of the market structure (monopoly vs competitive, etc) is needed. A regime
encapsulates a whole set of market parameters, with their appropriate range tailored
to a specific market condition, i.e. the dimensionality of the parameter space is de-
creased.
Economic regimes provide more degrees of freedom than ordinary regression based
approaches, since the full price distribution is available for decision making. Classical
time-series models assume a stationary environment, which is not true for micro-
economic environments. Economic regimes are a tool specially suited to make predic-
tions in non stationary environments. Economic regimes also provide an opportunity
of niche learning, i.e. an agent is able to apply different approaches and actions when
specific regimes are dominant.
1.5 Guide to the thesis
Here we outline the main contents of the chapters that follow.
Chapter 2 - Literature Review – We present a categorization of related work.
In particular, we examine work in multi-agent marketplaces, identification and
prediction of regimes, price prediction, order probability prediction, opponent
modeling, and agent design.
Chapter 3 - Simulation of a Multi-agent Supply-Chain Environment – We
describe the TAC SCM game, and we outline the architecture and design of our
MinneTAC agent.
Chapter 4 - Tactical and Strategic Sales Decision –We describe what an agent
needs to know to be able to make strategic and tactical sales decisions.
Chapter 5 - Economic Regimes –We introduce the concept of “economic regime”
and its representation based on learned probability density functions.
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Chapter 6 - Performance Evaluation – We show how our method is used in an
automated trading agent in TAC SCM and in financial markets, and we analyze
experimentally the performance of the method.
Chapter 7 - Conclusions – We conclude with a review of our contributions along
with considerations of future work in the area of economic regimes.
Appendix – For reader’s convenience, we present a summary of our notation and
details of some algorithms.
Figure 1.1 shows graphically the different parts of the decision processes of the agent
and maps them to chapters in this thesis.
Internal Agent Data
Derived Data
External Input Data
Economic Regime
Model − Ch. 5
Daily Price
Report − Ch. 5.3
Price Monitor
Ch. 5.3
Price Density
Ch. 5.5
Ch. 5.5
Ch. 5.6
Ch. 4.2
Ch. 4.2 Ch. 4.1
Inventory Status
Ch. 4.1
Cost Basis
Ch. 4.1
Ch. 3.1
Ch. 4.1
Calculation of
Offer Prices
Ch. 4.2
Median Price
Prediction
Ch. 5.5
Demand
Prediction
Current 
DemandConstraints
ResourceYesterday’s
Accepted Offers
Sales
Performance
Probability of
Order Model
Trend
Prediction
Allocation
Ch. 4.1
Figure 1.1: Pricing Chain. Allocation and regime modeling (double borders) are the
focus of the thesis. These are tools for strategic decision making. The calculation of
the offer prices is a tactical decision.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This work draws from several fields. In Computer Science, it is related to Artificial
Intelligence and autonomous agents, especially machine learning, planning, and rea-
soning under uncertainty. In Economics and Information Decision Science, it draws
from the framework of auction theory, probability theory, decision theory, and game
theory. From Operations Research, it draws from work in combinatorial optimization
and supply-chain management.
In this Chapter we explore previous work on world modeling, regime formulation,
model selection, opponent modeling, machine learning, and predictions in dynamic
multi-agent environment, especially electronic market places. We also review the work
on agent limitations, focusing primarily on handling limitations within the context of
decision making, and the connecting perception problem.
2.1 Electronic Commerce
2.1.1 Architectures and Auctions
Markets play an essential role in the economy, and market-based architectures are a
popular choice for multiple agents (see, for instance, [Chavez and Maes, 1996, Sycara
and Pannu, 1998, Wellman and Wurman, 1998, Collins et al., 2002a, Karacapilidis
and Mora¨ıtis, 2001, Choi and Liu, 2001]). Traditional economic approaches based on
common knowledge often do not work in electronic marketplaces, since the agents
usually lack large background information and the sophisticated reasoning ability of
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their human counterparts. In our research we focus on the study of economies of
manufacturer and customer agents, where physical goods are the objects of exchange.
Specifically, we are interested in how an agent manufacturer of physical goods can
efficiently learn about changing market conditions and use this knowledge to steer its
internal operations and adapt to the preferences of the customer population.
2.1.2 Issues
Electronic commerce has brought many opportunities and even more challenges.
[Gupta et al., 1996] discusses the economic challenges that electronic commerce will
present. The article deals with a wide range of issues from Internet traffic pricing to
information pricing to online micro payment to competitive markets. [Gupta et al.,
1997] discusses the problems that congestion will create and showed that it may be
detrimental for both customers and access providers to not have volume based traffic
pricing.
With the increasing number of companies doing business in the Internet, security and
trust in multi agent system to protect against fraud have gained an important role,
for instance in [Jaiswal et al., 2003] the authors identify the security vulnerabilities
of MAGNET and present a solution that overcomes these weaknesses.
2.2 Agents and Domain Modeling
2.2.1 Characterization of an Agent
All agents have three key attributes: perception, reasoning, and action. These three
components operate within the context of some environment. The percepts an agent
receives depends on the environment, and the actions an agents performs affects
the environment. We will characterize different types of environments an agent, or
multiple agents, can be in and the coupling between them. With general but careful
assumptions about the environment, agents can effectively reason about appropriate
actions to select.
2.2.2 Characterization of the Domain
In [Sutton and Barto, 1998] the authors define a model of the environment as anything
that an agent can use to predict how the environment will respond to its actions.
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Given a state and an action, a model produces a prediction of the resultant next
state and the next reward. If the model it stochastic then there are several different
possible next states and rewards and each has a attached a probability of occurrence.
Our special domain of interest are automated and mixed-initiative multi-agent sys-
tems in electronic markets. The characteristics of such an environment are listed
below:
• complex (many governing variables, spatio-temporal patterns)
• heterogeneous (different types of agents, different strategies)
• dynamic (structure is changing, interests are changing, patterns of communica-
tion/interaction are changing)
• limited resources (economic realities) and limitations on reasoning capability
• competitive environment (many direct or indirect opponents)
• not centralized and not centralizable, because their participants are self-interested,
rational, and economic agents
• unlimited time frame (no closing date)
• open market/system (influenced by other markets, external parameters)
• high degree of uncertainty (the participating agents have only limited knowledge
of the state of the world)
• strategic (agents need to implement many different strategies to compete in
the market) and strategic behaviors of agents (perform market manipulation to
exploit the environment to gain an advantage)
In Table 2.1 we characterize multi-agent systems 1 and classify TAC SCM in the given
schema.
1Table format taken from [Weiss, 1999].
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Attribute Range TAC SCM
number from two upward 6
uniformity homogeneous
. . . heterogeneous
heterogeneous
Agents goals contradicting
. . . complementary
contradicting
architecture reactive . . . deliberative deliberative
abilities (sensors, effec-
tors, cognition)
simple . . . advanced medium
frequency low . . . high depends on type
persistence short-term . . . long-term long-term
level signal-passing
. . . knowledge passing
signal passing
Interaction pattern (flow of control) decentralized
. . . centralized
decentralized
variability fixed . . . changeable changeable
purpose competitive
. . . cooperative
competitive
predictability foreseeable
. . . unforeseeable
partial foreseeable
accessibility and know-
ability
unlimited . . . limited limited
Environment dynamics fixed . . . variable variable
diversity poor . . . rich rich
availability of resources restricted . . . ample restricted
Table 2.1: Characterization of multi-agent systems and relationships with TAC SCM.
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2.3 Regime Formulation
The analysis in [Massey and Wu, 2005] shows that the ability of decision makers to
correctly identify the onset of a new regime can mean the difference between success
and failure. Furthermore they found strong evidence that individuals pay inordinate
attention to the signal (price in our case), and neglect diagnosticity (regime dynamics)
and transition probability (Markov matrix), the aspects of the system that generates
the signal. Individuals who do not pay enough attention to regime identification and
prediction have the tendency to over- or underreact to market conditions. The degree
to which used products cannibalize new product sales for books on Amazon.com is
analyzed empirically in [Ghose et al., 2006]. In their study they show that product
prices go through different regimes over time.
Marketing research methods have been developed to understand the conditions for
growth in performance and the role that marketing actions can play to improve sales.
For instance, [Pauwels and Hanssens, 2002, Pauwels and Hanssens, 2004] provide
marketing research methods to gain a dynamic understanding of the conditions for
performance growth and of the role marketing actions play to improve sales perfor-
mance in mature markets. The authors analyze how strategic windows of performance
change alternate with long periods of performance stability in mature economics mar-
kets.
All these methods fail to take into account market conditions that are not directly
observable. They are essentially regression models, and do not represent qualitative
differences in market conditions. Our method, in contrast, is able to detect and fore-
cast a broader range of market conditions. Regression based approaches (including
non-parametric variations) assume that the functional form of the relationship be-
tween dependent and independent variables has the same structure. An approach
like ours that models variability and does not assume a functional relationship pro-
vides more flexibility and detects changes in relationship between prices and sales
over time.
An analysis of the TAC SCM 2004 competition ([Kiekintveld et al., 2005]) shows
that supply and demand (expressed as regimes in our method) are key factors in
determining market prices, and that agents which were able to detect and exploit
these conditions had an advantage.
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2.4 Model Selection
Model selection is the task of choosing a model of optimal complexity for the given
(finite) data. A good overview about concept, theory and different methods of model
selection is given in [Cherkassky and Mulier, 1998]. Brooks et al. [Brooks et al.,
2002] addresses the problem of a monopolist producer agent selecting a model of a
population of customer agents to learn when it must account for the cost of learning.
2.5 Opponent Modeling
Since the success of a TAC SCM agent is likely to depend greatly on the strategies of
other agents, it is reasonable to assume that learning the behaviors of other agents
may be vital to good performance. The problem is that an agent in the TAC SCM
domain does not have direct contact with its opponents, e.g., while bidding for a
customer RFQ it only knows if it received an offer or not, but not which other agents
bid and at what price. Our suggest method of estimating and using regimes for price
prediction and other agent goals is a way of indirectly modeling opponents. Opponent
modeling is a hard problem in multi-agent systems and is successful only is smaller
settings so far.
Urszula Chajewska, Daphne Koller and Dirk Ormoneit [Chajewska et al., 2001] show a
method for predicting the future decisions of an agent based on it past decisions. They
are learning the agent’s utility functions by observing its behavior. Their approach
is based on the assumption that the agent is a rational decision maker. According
to decision theory, rational decision making amounts to the maximization of the
expected utility [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947]. In TAC SCM we cannot
assume that all the agents are rational.
Michael Littman [Littman, 1994] describes reinforcement learning approach to solv-
ing two-player zero-sum games in which the “max” operator in the update step of
standard Q-learning algorithm is replaced by a “minimax” operator that can be evalu-
ated by solving a linear program. He demonstrates the performance of his minimax-Q
learning algorithm on a grid-soccer scenario, where his algorithm plays against a ran-
dom player and a player of its own kind. The algorithm minimax-Q correctly extends
Q-learning to find optimal probabilistic policies. We could use the idea of grid-soccer
to implement our own learning algorithms and test them in this scenario.
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Carmel and Markovitch [Carmel and Markovitch, 1993] describe a game-player that
tries to analyze and learn the strategy of its opponent. They discuss the benefits
of using a model of the opponent s strategy, and give an algorithm called M* that
attempts to exploit the opponent s strategy.
2.6 Prediction Methods
Andrew Ng and Stuart Russel [Ng and Russell, 2000] show that the agent’s decisions
can be viewed as a set of linear constraints on the space of possible utility (reward)
functions. The simple reward structure they used in their experiments will not scale
to our future needs, i.e. offer price prediction in TAC SCM, we will need to extend
this.
2.6.1 Price Prediction
Predicting prices is an important part of the decision process of agents or human
decision makers. [Kephart et al., 2000] explored several dynamic pricing algorithms
for information goods, where shopbots look for the best price, and pricebots adapt
their prices to attract business. [Wellman et al., 2003] analyzed and developed metrics
for price prediction algorithms in the TAC Classic game, similar to what we have done
for TAC SCM.
TAC participants recognized early on that price prediction in connection with overall
agent performance is important [Stone and Greenwald, 2005]. [Stone et al., 2003] lists
a diversity of price prediction methods among TAC-Classic 2001 agents.
Brooks et al. [Brooks et al., 2002] designed pricing strategies for agents which exchange
information goods, they assessed their performance, and how well they adapt to
changing environmental situations. In our research we focus on agents which deal
with the exchange of physical goods, we intend to look into the implications when
dealing with information goods.
The University of Michigan team demonstrate a method [Kiekintveld et al., 2004]
for predicting future customer demand in the TAC SCM game environment, and use
the predicted future demand to inform agent behavior. Their approach is specific to
the TAC SCM situation, since it depends on knowing the formula by which customer
demand is computed. Note that customer demand is only one of the factors for
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characterizing the multi-dimensional regime parameter space.
The problem of allocating finite resources to producing a set of products in a way that
maximizes some measure of utility is the well-known “product-mix” problem ([Hillier
and Lieberman, 1990]).
Similar techniques have been used outside TAC SCM to predict offer prices in first
price sealed bid reverse auctions for IBM PCs ([Lawrence, 2003]), or PDA’s on eBay
([Ghani, 2005]).
In [Schapire et al., 2002] the problem of predicting prices of goods in auctions is
solved via a machine-learning approach. There method is based on logistic regression
and boosting which is explained in detail in [Collins et al., 2002b, Witten and Frank,
2000].
[Gupta et al., 2000] proposes alternative approaches for pricing Internet access dy-
namically. We are thinking to adapt parts of their non-parametric statistical tech-
nique to predict the daily order price range for different computer types.
2.6.2 Probability of Order Prediction
The problem of predicting the probability of order in sealed bid auctions is commonly
approached through statistical methods as those surveyed in [Papaioannou and Cas-
saigne, 2000]. These kinds of methods require large amounts of observed data in terms
of opponents bidding behavior and a static environment. TAC-SCM on the other side
is a highly dynamic and uncertain environment and therefore nearly all agents in the
TAC SCM competition use some dynamic way of modeling the probability of receiving
an order. Botticelli [Benisch et al., 2004] uses a linear CDF to determine the relation-
ship between offer price and order probability. We use a reverse CDF and take other
factors into account, such as quantity and due date. TacTex [Pardoe and Stone, 2004]
uses the lowest and highest offer price, which are provided for each product every day
by the game server, and determines the probability of an order by linear interpola-
tion. Their estimates depend only on the type of computer requested and the reserve
price, whereas we use more parameters in our previous work [Ketter et al., 2004c,
Ketter et al., 2004a, Ketter et al., 2004b] (6 parameters for the MaxEProfit strategy
and 5 parameters for the DemandDriven strategy). RedAgent [Keller et al., 2004], the
winner of last year TAC SCM , uses an internal marketplace structure with competing
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bidders to set offer prices. PackaTAC [Dahlgren and Wurman, 2004] lets other agents
set the price and tries to follow. The Jackaroo team [Zhang et al., 2004] applied a
game theoretic approach to set offer prices, using a variation of the Cournot game for
modeling the product market. PSUTAC [Sun et al., 2004] employs an expert system
for decision making. They are able to express market strategies and knowledge in
a human-understandable form. Pindyck et al. [Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998] give a
good overview of the science and art of building and using forecast models.
Since we estimated the bottleneck was going to be in the supply and not in the
production [McMillen, 2003], we did not worry, as other teams [Benisch et al., 2004,
Pardoe and Stone, 2004], about optimizing the production of our agent.
2.6.3 Evaluation of Predictive Quality
If competitions such as TAC-Classic and TAC-SCM are to be successful in facilitating
research, it will be necessary to separately evaluate methods that have been applied
to individual tasks [Stone, 2003], such as procurement and sales. Many of these
interesting tasks in such complex environments are not strictly separable, which makes
the evaluation of those tasks harder.
The University of Michigan team analyzed post-competition performance of the TAC
SCM winning agents and explored relationships between total profit and other mea-
surements of performance [Kiekintveld et al., 2005, Jordan et al., 2006]. The same
team [Wellman et al., 2006] translates end of game profit into a new metric, demand-
adjusted profit (DAP), which attempts to factor out profit variations caused by dif-
fering amounts of game demand. This use of control variates greatly reduces the
amount of variance in profit, and it is quite useful as a benchmark for agent perfor-
mance. DAP effectively controls the most influential market parameter, but there are
undoubtedly other market factors affecting profit, and if these were also accounted
for, variance could be reduced by an even greater margin.
Attempts have been made to control the profile space as well. For instance, [Wellman
et al., 2005] introduced a variation of the TAC games, called SCM↓3, which uses half
as many distinct agents per game and significantly reduces the profile space.
To facilitate analysis of TAC SCM games, the Supply Chain Trading Analysis and
Instrumentation Toolkit (AIT) has been developed [Benisch et al., 2005] and made
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available to the community. The tool simplifies downloading and parsing game data,
and provides support for analysis of agent performance, prices, market shares, average
daily prices, etc.
In [Babanov et al., 2003b], [Babanov et al., 2003a] and [Ketter et al., 2003] we describe
how an evolutionary framework could be used as a platform for systematic testing
of agent strategies and illustrate the idea with results from a simple supply-demand
model.
2.7 Agent Design
Most agent design efforts have focused on either the autonomous behavior aspects
of agency, or on interaction among agents. Shoham’s Agent-Oriented Program-
ming [Shoham, 1997] examines a cognitive and societal view of computation. Brad-
shaw’s KAoS agents [Bradshaw et al., 1997] are BDI agents in a CORBA environment.
Agents have capabilities based on existing document management applications. Nor-
man et al. [Norman et al., 1997] describe agent societies that model organizational
structures and automate business processes. These ADEPT agents negotiate over ser-
vice agreements that can involve many parties and many dimensions. JADE [Moraitis
et al., 2003] is an agent framework that has been used to build trading agents, and
could have been used for MinneTAC. However, its primary emphasis is on building
multi-agent systems that comply with FIPA specifications for inter-agent commu-
nications, and with flexible deployment in a network environment. This is not a
requirement for the TAC SCM domain. The MinneTAC design is compositional in
the sense of Brazier et al. [Brazier et al., 2002], but not hierarchically so. The DESIRE
method from Brazier et al. does not seem applicable to the MinneTAC situation, since
we are dealing with a single agent in an existing environment, and the blackboard
approach used in MinneTAC is not easily modeled with DESIRE. RETSINA [Sycara
and Pannu, 1998] suggests both a multi-agent architecture with a variety of agent
roles, and an architecture for individual agents that provides communications, plan-
ning, scheduling, and execution monitoring. This architecture could probably be
adapted to the TAC SCM domain, but its planning and communication capabilities
would not be especially useful. Vetsikas and Selman [Vetsikas and Selman, 2003] show
a method for studying design tradeoffs in a trading agent. This approach could be
likely be used effectively in MinneTAC.
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A few of the participants in TAC SCM have described their agent designs. He et
al. [He et al., 2006] have adopted a design consisting of three internal “agents” to
handle Sales, Procurement, and Production/Shipping. Sales decisions use a fuzzy
logic module. Some algorithmic detail is given, but there is little further detail on
the architecture of the agent. TacTex05, the winner of the 2005 competition [Pardoe
and Stone, 2006] is based on two major modules, a Supply Manager that handles
procurement, and a Demand Manager that handles sales, production, and shipping.
These modules are supported by a supplier model, a customer demand model, and a
pricing model that estimates sales order probability.
Ultimately, the TAC SCM problem domain does not require the sort of flexible cogni-
tive and social elements of these more “traditional” agent designs. Instead, our focus
has been on separating the decision tasks and supporting research needs, and we have
found the component-oriented model to be ideal.
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Chapter 3
Simulation of a Multi-Agent
Supply-Chain Environment
Electronic commerce is one of the more compelling application areas for autonomous
agents. In most electronic commerce applications, decisions can be relatively clear-
cut (buy or sell, set a price, submit a bid, award bids, etc.), and communications
among agents and between agents and their environments can be constrained and
highly scripted.
One way to drive development and understanding of decision making processes by
autonomous agents in complex domains is to hold competitions. An example of
such a competition is the Supply-Chain Management Trading Agent Competition
(TAC SCM) [Collins et al., 2005], an international tournament which engages agents
in simultaneous buying, selling, production scheduling, and inventory management
problems.
This Chapter provides an overview of TAC SCM and outlines the design of the Min-
neTAC trading agent, which has competed effectively in TAC SCM for several years.
The design has attempted to respond both to the challenges of the game scenario as
well as to the need to support multiple relatively independent research efforts that are
focused on meeting one or more of those challenges. We evaluate the success of our
design both in terms of the competitiveness of the agents that have been implemented
with it, and in terms of its ability to support our research agenda.
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3.1 TAC SCM Game Description
In a TAC SCM game, each of the competing agents plays the part of a manufac-
turer of personal computers. In an instance of a TAC SCM game six autonomous
agents compete with each other in the procurement market, where they buy computer
parts, and in the sales market, where they sell computers to customers, as shown in
Figure 3.1.
Offers
RFQs
Orders
Shipments
MinneTAC
TACTex
PSUTac
RedAgent
DeepMaize
Mertacor
RFQs
Offers
Orders
Shipments
Pintel
IMD
Basus
Macrostar
Mec
Queenmax
Watergate
Mintor
Suppliers Agents Customers
Figure 3.1: Schematic overview of a typical TAC SCM game scenario. Six autonomous
agents compete to buy parts from suppliers and to sell finished computers to cus-
tomers.
Availability of parts and demand for computers varies randomly through the game
and across market segments (low, medium, and high computer price). The market
is affected not only by variations in supply and demand, but also by the actions
of the other agents. The small number of agents and their ability to adapt and to
manipulate the market makes the game highly dynamic and uncertain. Each agent is
self-interested and tries to maximize its profit, while competing with the other agents
for raw materials (parts) and customer orders.
The simulation takes place over 220 virtual days, each lasting fifteen seconds of real
time. Each agent starts with no inventory and an empty bank account, and must
borrow money (and pay interest) to build up an initial parts inventory before it can
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begin assembling and selling computers. Agents pay for the parts they buy, pay
interest on the money they borrow, and pay storage costs for their inventory. If they
ship computers late, they pay late penalty. Agents earn money by selling computers.
Any inventory left at the end of the game has no residual value. The agent with the
largest bank balance at the end of the game wins.
A Component Catalog, see Table 3.1, and Bill of Materials, see Table 3.2, are sent
to each agent at the beginning of the game. The Component Catalog lists each part,
along with its base price and the list of suppliers who can produce it. Each part is
produced by one or two suppliers; each supplier provides two different types of parts.
The Bill of Materials lists 16 different combinations of parts that can be assembled
into personal computers (PC). Each of these computer types is identified uniquely by
a stock keeping unit number. Each computer type is assigned a number of processing
cycles that specifies how much time it takes to assemble that type of computer from
raw materials. These PCs are the finished goods of the TAC SCM supply chain.
To obtain parts, an agent must send a request for quotes (RFQ) to an appropriate
supplier. Each RFQ specifies a part type, a quantity, and a due date. The next day,
the agent receives a response to each of its requests.
Suppliers respond by evaluating each RFQ to determine how many parts they can
deliver on the requested due date and how long it would take to produce all the
parts requested, considering the outstanding orders they have committed to and the
RFQs they have already responded to in this turn. If the supplier can produce the
desired quantity on time, it responds with an offer that contains the price of the parts
supplied. If not, the supplier responds with two offers: (1) an earliest complete offer
with a revised due date and a price, and (2) a partial offer with a revised quantity
and a price. The agent can accept either of these alternative offers, or reject both.
Suppliers may deliver late, due to randomness in their production capacities. If a sup-
plier has excess capacity, the price offered for its parts will be discounted; discounted
prices may be as low as 50% of the base price.
Once an agent has parts to assemble computers, it must schedule the assembly tasks in
its production facility. Each computer model requires a specified number of assembly
cycles, and the assembly capacity of each agent is limited. Assembled computers are
added to the agent’s finished-goods inventory, and may be shipped to customers to
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satisfy outstanding orders.
Every day each agent receives a set of RFQs from potential customers. Each customer
RFQ specifies the type of computers requested, along with quantity, due date, reserve
price, and late penalty. Each agent may choose to bid on some or all of the day’s
RFQs. Customers accept the lowest bid that is at or below their reserve price, and
notify the winning agent the following day.
The agent must ship customer orders on time, or pay a penalty for each day an order
is late. If a product is not shipped within five days of the due date the order is
canceled, the agent receives no payment, and no further penalties accrue.
Table 3.1 shows the part catalog for a typical game, with information about each
part, its base price, and the suppliers that produce it.
Part Base price Supplier Description
100 1000 Pintel Pintel CPU, 2.0 GHz
101 1500 Pintel Pintel CPU, 5.0 GHz
110 1000 IMD IMD CPU, 2.0 GHz
111 1500 IMD IMD CPU, 5.0 GHz
200 250 Basus, Macrostar Pintel motherboard
210 250 Basus, Macrostar IMD motherboard
300 100 MEC, Queenmax Memory, 1 GB
301 200 MEC, Queenmax Memory, 2 GB
400 300 Watergate, Mintor Hard disk, 300 GB
401 400 Watergate, Mintor Hard disk, 500 GB
Table 3.1: Part Catalog
There is a total of 10 different parts, which can be combined to build 16 different PC
configurations, as described in the Bill of Materials given in Table 3.2.
Computer types are classified into three market segments: High range, Mid range,
and Low range. For each of these market segments, at the start of each day, d, cus-
tomers exhibit their demand by issuing N customer RFQs, according to the following
distribution (described in [Collins et al., 2005]):
N = poisson(Qd) (3.1)
where Qd is the “target average” number of customer RFQs for day d issued in each
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SKU Parts Cycles Market segment
1 100, 200, 300, 400 4 Low range
2 100, 200, 300, 401 5 Low range
3 100, 200, 301, 400 5 Mid range
4 100, 200, 301, 401 6 Mid range
5 101, 200, 300, 400 5 Mid range
6 101, 200, 300, 401 6 High range
7 101, 200, 301, 400 6 High range
8 101, 200, 301, 401 7 High range
9 110, 210, 300, 400 4 Low range
10 110, 210, 300, 401 5 Low range
11 110, 210, 301, 400 5 Low range
12 110, 210, 301, 401 6 Mid range
13 111, 210, 300, 400 5 Mid range
14 111, 210, 300, 401 6 Mid range
15 111, 210, 301, 400 6 High range
16 111, 210, 301, 401 7 High range
Table 3.2: Bill of Materials. Each row shows the components needed to build each
computer type and the corresponding market segment.
market segment. Qd is varied using a trend τ that is updated by a random walk:
Qd+1 = min(Qmax ,max(Qmin , τdQd)) (3.2)
τd+1 = max(τmin ,min(τmax , τd + random(−0.01, 0.01)) (3.3)
Q0, the start value of Q, is chosen uniformly in the interval [Qmin , Qmax ] (see Ta-
ble 3.3), and τ0, the start value of the τ , is 1.0. The trend τ is reset to 1.0 when
the random walk exceeds the minimum or maximum boundaries. In other words, if
τdQd < Qmin or τdQd > Qmax then taud+1 = 1.0 . This reduces the bimodal tendency
of the random walk.
3.1.1 Game Parameters
Table 3.3 gives the parameter settings for the standard TAC SCM competition games.
Values for most of these parameters are sent to the agents at the start of every game.
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 specify the visibility of the game parameters during the games.
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Parameter Standard Game Setting
Length of game 220 days
Agent assembly cell capacity 2000 assembly cycles / day
Nominal capacity of supplier assembly lines
Cnom
500 parts / day
Start capacity of the suppliers assembly lines Cnom ± 35%
Supplier price discount factor δ 0.5
Down payment due on placement of supplier
order
10%
Acceptable purchase ratio for single-source
suppliers
0.9
Acceptable purchase ratio for two-source sup-
pliers
0.45
Initial reputation endownment 2000
Reputation recovery rate 100 units/day
Computer types in the low range market 1, 2, 9, 10 and 11.
Computer types in the mid range market 3, 4, 5, 12, 13 and 14.
Computer types in the high range market 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16.
Average number of customer RFQs
[Qmin , Qmax ] in the High and Low range
markets
25 – 100 per day
Average number of customer RFQs
[Qmin , Qmax ] in the Mid range market
30 – 120 per day
Interval between Market Reports 20 days
RFQ volume trend for customers [τmin , τmax ]
(all market segments)
[0.95, 1/0.95]
Range of quantities for individual customer
RFQs [qmin , qmax ]
[1, 20]
Range of lead time (due date) for customer
RFQs [duemin , duemax ]
3 to 12 days from the day the
RFQ is received
Range of penalties for customer RFQs
[Ψmin ,Ψmax ]
5% to 15% of the customer re-
serve price per day
Customer Reserve Price 75 – 125% of nominal price of
the PC parts
Annual bank debt interest rate [αmin , αmax ] 6.0 – 12.0%
Annual bank deposit interest rate [α′min , α
′
max ] 0.5α
Annual storage cost rate [Smin , Smax ] 25% – 50% of nominal price
Short-term horizon for supplier commitments
Tshort
20 days
Down payment due on supplier order 10%
Daily reduction in supplier available capacity
for long-term commitments z
0.25%
Table 3.3: Parameters used in the TAC SCM game.23
The parameter average unit sales price, which is listed in Table 3.5, is computed every
20 days for the previous 20 days in the following manner:
AvergeUnitSalesPrice =
∑
i∈I
OrderQuantity(i) ×OrderUnitPrice(i)∑
i∈I
OrderQuantity(i)
(3.4)
Parameter Visibility
Parts inventory for each agent. None
Total quantity per part produced by the sup-
pliers since the last market report.
Every 20 days in market report
Total quantity per part delivered by the sup-
pliers since the last market report.
Every 20 days in market report
Table 3.4: Parameter visibility in the raw-material market of the TAC SCM game.
Parameter Visibility
Customer RFQs (RFQid, computer type, due
date, penalty, reserve price)
Full
Total number of bids per customer RFQ. None
Total number of computers offered per cus-
tomer RFQ.
None
Unit offer price per customer RFQ per agent. None
Inventory by computer type of each agent. None
Total quantity per computer type ordered by
the customers since the last market report.
Every 20 days in market report
Average unit sales price per computer type or-
dered by the customers since the last market
report (see Equation 3.4).
Every 20 days in market report
Lowest and highest unit order price per com-
puter type.
One day delayed in price re-
port.
Table 3.5: Parameter visibility in the customer market of the TAC SCM game.
3.2 The design of the MinneTAC trading agent
To address the design challenges of the MinneTAC agent, we follow a component-
oriented approach [Szyperski, 1998]. The idea is to provide an infrastructure that
manages data and interactions with the game server, allowing individual researchers
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to encapsulate agent decision problems within the bounds of individual components
that have minimal dependencies among themselves. Two pieces of software form the
foundation of MinneTAC: the Apache Excalibur component framework [Foundation,
2006], and the “agentware” package distributed by the TAC SCM game organizers.
Excalibur provides the standards and tools to build components and configure working
agents from collections of individual components, and the agentware package handles
interaction with the game server.
The MinneTAC agent is a set of components layered on the Excalibur container,
as shown in Figure 3.2. Four of these components are responsible for the major
decision processes: Sales, Procurement, Production, and Shipping. All data that
must be shared among components is kept in the Repository, which acts as a black-
board [Buschmann et al., 1996]. The Oracle is host to a large number of smaller
components that maintain the market and inventory models, and do analysis and
prediction. The Communications component handles all interaction with the game
server. The components themselves are identified by their roles; in several cases
multiple components have been built to fill those roles. It is an explicit goal of this
architecture to minimize couplings between the components. Ideally, each component
depends only on Excalibur and the Repository.
Repository
Shipping Sales
Procurement Production
Communications Oracle
Avalon Container
Figure 3.2: MinneTAC Architecture. Arrows indicate API dependencies.
The agent opens three configuration files when it starts. The system configuration file
specifies the set of roles that make up the system. The component configuration file
specifies runtime configuration options for each component. For example, the Sales
component may have a parameter that controls the maximum level of overcommit-
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ment of its existing inventory or capacity when it makes customer offers. The log
configuration file controls the names and locations of log files that are produced by
the running agent, the general format of log entries, and for each component, the
level of detail to be logged.
3.2.1 MinneTAC components
The MinneTAC agent consists of seven components. We describe these components
and their responsibilities briefly here. More details on the architecture and imple-
mentation are in [Collins et al., 2007].
Repository is the unifying element of the MinneTAC design, the one component
that is visible to the other components. It serves as an internal database,
maintains the state of the system, and notifies other components of changes in
state. All other activity is driven by these state changes. Ii also provides the
core elements of the Evaluation subsystem.
Communications handles communication with the game server. This includes join-
ing games, acquiring initial game parameters, importing start-of-game and daily
data into the Repository, and retrieving agent decisions from the Repository for
communication back to the game server.
Procurement procures parts. It may build and maintain target inventory levels,
it may attempt to procure parts to meet customer orders, or it may use some
other decision process. It must issue RFQs to suppliers and decide whether to
accept offers that are returned.
Production schedules the manufacturing facility. It may build and maintain target
finished goods inventory levels, or it may build only to meet existing customer
orders.
Sales makes offers in response to customer RFQs. It must decide, for each RFQ,
whether to bid and what price to quote, based on available and predicted inven-
tories and current market conditions. A sophisticated Sales component might
attempt to predict the probability of order acceptance in order to maximize
profits.
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Shipping ships product to customers. In general, there is a benefit in shipping
product as late as possible, because this gives the agent an opportunity to
minimize penalties for late deliveries. Late deliveries can happen, for example,
if predicted inventories do not materialize due to late supplier shipments.
Oracle maintains market models and predicts future demand and availability. This
is done primarily through a set of Evaluators.
To minimize coupling between the various components we use evaluations that are
accessible through the various data elements in the Repository. The general idea is
that when a component needs to make a decision, it will inspect the available data
and run some utility-maximizing function. The available data consists of any data it
maintains internally, and the data in the repository. Any data reductions or analyses
that are performed on Repository data can be encapsulated in the form of Evaluations,
and made available to other components. These analyses are implemented by the
Oracle component through a configurable set of evaluators.
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Chapter 4
Tactical and Strategic Sales
Decision
We are primarily interested in competitive market environments that are constrained
by resources and/or production capacity. In such an environment, a manager who
wants to maximize the value of available resources should be concerned about both
strategic and tactical decisions.
The basic strategic decision is to allocate the available resources (financial, capacity,
inventory, etc.) over some time horizon in a way that is expected to return the
maximum yield. For example, in a market that has a strong seasonal variation, one
might want to build up an inventory of finished goods during the off season, when
demand is low and prices are weak, in order to prepare for an expected period of
strong demand and high prices.
For the purpose of this work, tactical decisions are concerned with setting prices
to maximize profits, within the parameters set by the strategic decisions. So, for
instance, if the forecast sales volume for the current week is 100,000 units, we would
want to find the highest sales price that would move that volume.
We will show how our technique of modeling the economic regimes in a market can
be used to inform both the strategic and tactical decision processes. In Figure 4.1
we show this process in a schematic way. In our formulation, a regime is essentially
a distribution of prices over sales volume. We characterize the market in terms of
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Regime Identification Regime Prediction
Tactical
Decision Process Decision Process
Strategic
Figure 4.1: Process chart – Regime identification is a tool for tactical decision making
and regime prediction is a tool for strategic decision making.
regimes. For tactical decisions, we approximate the probability of selling a product
at a given asking price. This combined with demand information leads directly to
(nearly) optimal pricing decisions.
To make strategic decisions, we need to forecast regime shifts in the market. If our
forecast shows an upcoming period of low demand and weak prices, we may want to
sell more aggressively in the short term, and we may want to limit procurement and
production to prevent driving an oversupply into the market. On the other hand, if
our forecast shows an upcoming period of high demand and strong prices, we may
want to increase procurement and production, and raise short-term prices, in order
to be well-positioned for the future.
We wish to maximize the profit the agent can expect to earn over some reasonable
period in the future. Our approach is to treat procurement, production, and sales
as separate components each with its own decision process, and to keep interactions
among the components to a minimum. This is common in industries where procure-
ment, and often production as well, are driven by relatively long-term forecasts, while
sales is expected to move the products it has available to sell (and expects to have in
the future) at the best possible price.
In the MinneTAC agent, sales interact with procurement primarily through current
and expected inventories. Both sales and procurement have access to projections
of future customer demand (see [Kiekintveld et al., 2004]) and to customer pricing
models. Production is primarily to order, except that small inventories of finished
goods are maintained to support short lead-time demand.
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Sales decisions must allocate the agent’s resources over two dimensions, product mix
and time, in a way that maximizes value. In the TAC SCM environment, the small
number of competitors means that individual agents have capacity to supply a signifi-
cant fraction of the total market, and therefore the power to depress prices by offering
too much product. Production is primarily driven by sales, which also determine what
is produced. Because procurement is at least partly driven by projected inventories
and by predicted customer demand, sales activity also influences procurement. But
procurement typically operates over a longer time horizon, and sales must be focused
on getting the highest possible prices for the products it has available. If inventory
is sold out during a period when prices are low, then there may be nothing available
to sell when prices recover.
4.1 Strategic decision – resource allocation1
Sales decisions can be informed both by experience in the past and by current ob-
servations. We first focus on the information that is visible to the agent during the
game. In TAC SCM, game data include the following:
• C is the set of all available component types.
• G is the set of all goods (product types) that can be built and sold. Each good
is made up of a set Cg of components. This means that in turn, each component
c is a part of some set of products Gc.
• On each day d, customer demand is represented by a set Rd of customer RFQs
received by the agent. Each RFQ r ∈ Rd specifies a product type gr, a lead
time of ir days, a quantity qr, and a reserve price ρr. Reserve price is uniformly
distributed between ρmin and ρmax. Details and semantics are given in [Collins
et al., 2005].
• Customer demand is projected into the future over some planning horizon h.
In the TAC SCM scenario, we model customer demand following the method
given in [Kiekintveld et al., 2004]. For each market segment m, and for each
future day over some planning horizon h, this produces expected values for
mean demand Qmd,i, i = 0 . . . h, and for demand trend τ
m
d,i.
1We are indebted to John Collins for the development of the material in this Section.
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• At the beginning of each day d, the agent has an inventory of raw materials
consisting of Id,c for each component type c ∈ C, and an inventory of finished
goods consisting of Id,g for each type of good g ∈ G.
• On each day d, there is a set of outstanding customer orders Ocustd that have
not yet been shipped or canceled, and a set of outstanding supplier orders Osuppd
that have not yet been received.
From this data, we would like to find a way to set prices and respond to customers’
RFQ to maximize the agent’s overall profits. On any given day d, the total demand
Dd,g for a given good g among Rcustd is the total of the of the requested quantities
among requests for good g, given by
Dd,g =
∑
r∈Rcust
d,g
qr (4.1)
We assume that the price priced,g = f(Dd,g, Ad,g) sustainable by the market for a given
product p on a particular day d is a function of the demand Dd,g and the quantity of
product the agent wishes to sell represented by the allocation or sales quota Ad,g for
good g on day d.
The profit per unit for product p to be sold on day d at price priced,g is given by
Φd,g = discount(d)(priced,g − cost(Cg)) (4.2)
We include the discount term as a rough approximation of inventory holding cost. It
can also be used to encourage early selling, as a hedge against the uncertainty of the
game.
For any given day d, there is an unsold inventory I ′g of good g, and an expected
uncommitted inventory I ′d,c of parts of type c. This includes parts in current inventory,
and parts that are expected to be delivered by day d, and excludes parts that are
committed to producing goods for outstanding customer orders.
The effective demand function Deffd,g = f(Dd,g, priced,g) for our goods will be some
function of the prices priced,g we wish to charge. In the TAC SCM environment,
there is a linear distribution of reserve prices among customer RFQs. The effective
demand, then, is the portion of total demand with reserve prices ρ ≥ priced,g at or
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above the price we want to sell at:
Deffd,g =
ρmaxg − priced,g
ρmaxg − ρming
Dd,g (4.3)
where ρmaxg is the maximum reserve price for good g. This assumes that actual demand
is uniformly distributed across the range of reserve prices, which is only approximately
correct.
The total profit Φ over a planning horizon of h days for the set of goods G is then
Φ =
h∑
d=0
∑
g∈G
Φd,gAd,g (4.4)
This is what we wish to maximize, by computing values for Ad,g, subject to the
following constraints:
1. We can’t sell more of any product than the effective demand at the price we
wish to charge:
∀d,∀g,Ad,g < Deffd,g (4.5)
2. For any given period of time from now until the planning horizon h, we can sell
goods that we have in inventory, and goods for which we have the necessary
parts in inventory. Note that this is unnecessarily conservative, since we are
asking for goods or their parts to be available at the time we propose to sell
them, not when we expect to ship them. This means that we cannot easily
discriminate on lead time.
∀m ∈ 1..h,∀c ∈ C,
m∑
d=1
∑
g∈Gc
Ad,g ≤ I ′m,c +
∑
g∈Gc
I ′g (4.6)
Note that this constraint limits commitments of the sets of goods that share a
given component. If we don’t carry any uncommitted finished goods inventory,
in other words if ∀g ∈ Gc, I ′g = 0, then this is a sufficient expression of inventory
constraint. Otherwise, imbalances in the finished-goods inventories of individual
goods sharing a component could lead to overcommitment. This is easy to see if
for some component c, I ′m,c = 0. Then the sum of individual product inventories
constrain the whole set of products. In this case, it is also necessary to constrain
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every subset of product types that can share some component. This requires
that we replace Equation 4.6 with
∀m ∈ 1..h,∀c ∈ C,∀G ′c ⊆ Gc,
m∑
d=1
∑
g∈Gc
Ad,g ≤ I ′m,c +
∑
g∈G′c
I ′g (4.7)
3. The agent’s factory has limited daily capacity F . If each unit of good g requires
yg production cycles, then
∀m ∈ 1..h,∑
g∈G
yg
(
m∑
d=1
Ad,g − I ′g
)
≤ mF − F commitm (4.8)
where F commitm is the factory capacity that is committed to manufacture all
outstanding customer orders that are due on or before day m and are not
satisfiable by existing finished goods inventory.
The outcome of our objective function (Eq. 4.4) is daily sales quotas Ad,g for each
good. The next step is to set prices so that we sell what we intend to sell, in a
competitive market. Assume we have a formula for probability of a customer placing
an order as a function of price P (order |price), produced by some learning process
(see Sect. 5.6). But the quantity we sell is just the effective demand multiplied by
the probability of order at the price we set. So to make our sales quota, we need
Ad,g = P (order |priced,g)Deffd,g (4.9)
In the TAC SCM environment, with its linear distribution of reserve prices, this gives
Ad,g = P (order |priced,g)
ρmaxg − priced,g
ρmaxg − ρming
Dd,g (4.10)
which is quadratic in priced,g, assuming that P (order |priced,g) is linear. Combining
Equation 4.4 with Equations 4.2 and 4.10, we have
Φ =
n∑
d=1
∑
g∈G
discount(d)
(
priced,g − cost(Cg)
)
P (order |priced,g)
ρmaxg − priced,g
ρmaxg − ρming
Dd,g
(4.11)
which is at least cubic in priced,g.
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Because the formula for sales quota allocations above is probably unsolvable given the
time constraints of the TAC SCM game environment, there is a need for heuristics
and simplifications. An obvious simplification is to assume that the partial derivative
of the order probability function with respect to price is very steep. This is equivalent
to saying that (most) sales occur at a “market clearing price,” or alternatively that
the probability of order is much more sensitive to price than is profit. Then the
per-unit profit and the effective demand can be computed separately, by substituting
an estimated clearing price priceestd,g for the actual sales price into Eq. 4.2. We will
explore a way to compute priceestd,g in the next section.
4.2 Tactical decision – sales offer pricing
Once the strategic sales process has determined daily sales quotas, the next step is to
set prices for our goods that will yield the maximum profit. This amounts to finding,
for each good, the value for priced,g that satisfies the relation
Ad,g
Deffd,g
= P (order |priced,g) (4.12)
which is a simple rearrangement of Eq. 4.9.
This could be solved analytically or numerically, assuming we have reasonable func-
tions for Deffd,g and P (order |priced,g). In general, however, one or both of these func-
tions are likely to be empirically-derived. Under the previous assumption of most sales
occurring close to a market clearing price, we can approximate Deffd,g using price
est
d,g,
reducing the computation to finding the value of priced,g that satisfies
Ad,g
Deffd,g(price
est
d,g)
= P (order |priced,g) (4.13)
When prices are set in this way, the resulting customer orders provide an additional
signal from the market that can be used to refine our estimate of priceestd,g. If Od,g is
the number of orders placed for good g on day d (as a result of offers made on day
d− 1), then a refined estimate of the actual market prices on that day priceactd−1,g can
be found by finding an adjusted probability distribution P adj (order |priced−1,g) such
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that
Od,g
Deffd−1,g(priced−1,g)
= P adj (order |priced−1,g) (4.14)
and computing an estimated actual price priceactd−1,g such that
Ad−1,g
Deffd−1,g(priced−1,g)
= P adj (order |priceactd−1,g) (4.15)
See Fig. 4.2 for a graphical visualization of this relationship. For simplicity, we
illustrate an approximate adjustment made by shifting the location of the probability
curve along the price axis without changing its shape.
P (order |price)
pricepriceact
P
O/Deff
price
P adj
A/Deff
Figure 4.2: Estimating actual market price, given order volume O and an estimate of
the order probability function P .
The resulting estimate priceactd−1,g is subject to the randomness of the market, and
therefore we use an exponentially smoothed offset to produce a refined value of priceestd,g
each day, as
priceestd,g = price
pred
d,g + δd,g (4.16)
where pricepredd,g is the predicted market price for product g (see Sect. 5.5), and δd,g is
updated daily as
δd,g = αδd−1,g + (1− α)(priceactd−1,g − priced−1,g) (4.17)
for some appropriate value of α.
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Chapter 5
Economic Regimes
Market conditions change over time, and this should affect the strategy used by
an agent in procurement, production planning, resource allocation, and pricing of
goods. For example, in order to make the strategic allocation decision described in
Section 4.1, the agent needs predictions of the future values of P (order |price).
Economic theory [Kearl, 1989] suggests that economic environments exhibit three
dominant market patterns: scarcity, balanced, and oversupply. We define a scarcity
condition if there is more customer demand than product supply in the market, a
balanced condition if demand is approximately equal to supply, and an oversupply
condition if there is less customer demand than product supply in the market. When
there is scarcity, prices are higher, so the agent should price more aggressively. In
balanced situations, prices are lower and have more spread, so the agent has a range
of options for maximizing expected profit. In oversupply situations prices are lower.
The agent should primarily control costs, and therefore either do pricing based on
costs, or wait for better market conditions.
5.1 Interpretation of order probability
Since the prediction of the probability of receiving a customer order for a given price,
P (order |price), is an integral part of any sales agent we need to consider which
parameters are available during the game, and decide how to use them. From a sales
perspective it would be ideal to know all the offer and order prices and their associate
quantities, but as described in Chapter 3, this is not the case in TAC SCM. We
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have only limited price visibility, and do not know the associated quantities at all.
Everyday the agent receives a price report with the minimum and maximum product
order prices from the previous day. Since the agent has only access to the accepted
offer prices we need to produce a formulation of the probability of order that only
includes those, and not the rejected offers.
We define RFQ ji as the number of RFQs per computer type i over a particular time
period j . What is not observable during the TAC SCM game is the level of supply
Offers ji , i.e., the number of all the offers made per computer type i during period j .
Typically Offers ji > RFQ
j
i . In each time period j the following condition between
RFQ ji and Offers
j
i holds
Offers ji = E
(
βji
)
× RFQ ji (5.1)
E
(
βji
)
represents the expected mean number of bids per computer type i over the
time period j. If we assume that all six agents always bids on every RFQ then β = 6;
on the other hand, if all the agents are equally likely to bid or not to bid then β = 3.
However, if we assume that bidding is stable, i.e., the expectation on the number
of bids can be computed in an unbiased manner, then for every price the number
of accepted bids affects the probabilities at higher prices in a similar manner. This
implies that probabilities are scaled up in a similar fashion. Consider the relationship
between the actual order probability P (Sji |price) which includes rejected bids and the
cumulative demand order probability P (Dji |price) which does not consider rejected
bids. We can calculate P (Dji |price) as we will show in Equation 5.33. However the
question remains on what is the relationship between P (Dji |price) and P (Sji |price)
and how to use P (Dji |price) for making optimal pricing decisions.
Let’s consider the relationship between the two measures first. Let Aji (price) be the
number of accepted offers for computer type i in time period j at or below price, and
Xji the total number of accepted offers for computer type i in the same time period
j. Then we get
P (Dji |price) =
Aji (price)
Xji
(5.2)
By definition the total number of bids for computer type i in time period j equals
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βji ×Xji . Therefore
P (Sji |price) =
Aji (price)
βji ×Xji
(5.3)
=
P (Dji |price)
β
(5.4)
Equation 5.1 implies that for every sale there were on average β offers made. Therefore
the actual order probability is simply scaled by β as compared to our estimated
cumulative demand order probability P (Dji |price), as Equation 5.3 indicates. From
Equation 5.3, we can derive
P (Sji |price1)
P (Sji |price2)
=
P (Dji |price1)
P (Dji |price2)
(5.5)
i.e., the relative order probability at two prices is the same. Therefore, if we want to
calculate the relative likelihood of a sale at two different prices then both measures
can be used to arrive at the same optimal price choice through revenue maximization
and a mathematical programming model. Therefore we can base our order proba-
bility curves only on accepted offers. This of course assumes that the TAC SCM
environment is dynamically stable. Based on observed game data we have evidence
that this assumption holds.
Figure 5.1 shows sample curves for P (order |price), the probability of receiving an
order for a given offer price. The shape of the curve and its position changes over
time. According to economic theory, consistent high prices correspond to a situation
of scarcity, where price elasticity is small, while a less steep slope corresponds to a
balanced market where the range of prices is larger.
We believe that even though the market is constantly changing, there are some under-
lying dominant patterns that characterize the aforementioned market conditions. We
define a specific mode a market can be in as a regime. A way of solving the decision
problem an agent is faced with is to characterize those regimes and to apply specific
decision making methods to each regime. This requires the agent to have methods
for figuring out what is the current regime and for predicting which future regimes
to expect in its planning horizon.
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Figure 5.1: The reverse cumulative density function represents the probability of
order. Typical order probability curves during scarcity (left top), balanced (left mid-
dle) and oversupply (left bottom) regimes and experimental order probability curves
(right).
5.2 Learning from historical sales data
The first phase in our approach is to identify and characterize market regimes by an-
alyzing data from past sales. The assumption we make is that enough historical data
are available for the analysis and that historical data are sufficiently representative
of possible market conditions. Information observable in real-time in the market is
then used to identify the current regime and to forecast regime transitions.
Since prices are likely to have different ranges for different goods, we normalize them.
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We call npg the normalized price for good g and define it as follows:
npg =
priceg
AssemblyCostg +
∑numParts
j=1 NominalPartCostg ,j
(5.6)
where NominalPartCostg ,j is the nominal cost of the j-th part for good g, numParts
is the number of parts needed to make the good g, and AssemblyCostg is the cost of
manufacturing the good g. An advantage of using normalized prices is that we can
easily compare price patterns across different goods. In the following we just use np,
since we normalized goods across one market.
Historical data are used to estimate the price density, p(np), and to characterize
regimes. We estimate the price density function by fitting a Gaussian mixture model
(GMM)( [Titterington et al., 1985]) to historical normalized price, np, data.
We present results using a GMM with fixed means, µi, and fixed variances, σi, since
we want one set of Gaussians to work for all games off-line and online. We use the
Expectation-Maximization (EM) Algorithm ([Dempster et al., 1977]) to determine the
prior probability, P (ζi), of the Gaussians components of the GMM. The means, µi,
are uniformly distributed and the variances, σ2i , tile the space. Specifically variances
were chosen so that adjacent Gaussians are two standard deviations apart.
The density of the normalized price can be written as:
p(np) =
N∑
i=1
p(np|ζi)P (ζi) (5.7)
where p(np|ζi) is the i-th Gaussian from the GMM, i.e.,
p(np|ζi) = p(np|µi, σi) = 1
σi
√
2π
e
[−(np−µi)
2
2×σ2
i
]
(5.8)
where µi is the mean and σi is the standard deviation of the i-th Gaussian from the
GMM. An example of a GMM is shown in Figure 5.2.2.
5.2.1 Reasons for selecting a Gaussian Mixture Model
We use a GMM since it is able to approximate arbitrary density functions. Another
advantage is that the GMM is a semi-parametric approach which can be computed
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fast and uses less memory than other approaches. The GMM is one way of modeling
a probability density function p(x), given a finite number of data points Xn, n =
1,. . . ,N drawn from that density.
We decided to advocate this model over other possible models for various reasons.
First, there are three alternatives to approach the density estimation problem: para-
metric, non-parametric and semi-parametric. In parametric methods one assumes a
specific functional form for the density model. Its parameters are then optimized by
fitting the model to the data set, e.g. functional form: normal or Gaussian distribu-
tion and parameters: the mean µ and standard deviation σ of that distribution. The
drawback is that the functional form might not be consistent with the data and may
result in unsatisfactory estimation.
In non-parametric estimation methods the form of the density is determined entirely
by the data, i.e. no particular functional form is assumed, e.g., histograms, kernel-
based methods, K-nearest-neighbors and Parzen window [Bishop, 1995, Duda et al.,
2000, Nabney, 2001]. The drawback is that huge data sets are needed for good models
and that parameter tuning is critical for performance of the method.
In semi-parametric estimation methods a general class of functional forms is allowed
and the number of adaptive parameters can be adapted in a systematic way allowing
even more flexible models, e.g. more hidden units, multi-layer perceptrons, radial
basis functions and Gaussian mixture models. The advantage of this method is that
it combines the best characteristics of parametric and non-parametric methods. This
is especially important in electronic marketplaces where the demand might be low for
a long period, but then rapidly change to high. The complexity of the model only
increases with the total number of parameters in the model, and not simply with the
size of the data set.
The demand characteristics in electronic marketplaces have been found to be fractal,
that is the short-term demand pattern has much larger variation and mean than
the long-term time-averaged demand pattern [Gupta et al., 1997]. This means that
while there are periods of no or little demand there will be periods when demand
will be extremely high. The pricing strategy of an agent needs to take this into
account. Traditionally parameterized econometric models perform extremely poor
in these situations. On the contrary, non-parametric approaches do an excellent job
in estimation, but these methods are usually computationally too expensive. In the
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TAC SCM domain we need to make decisions fast and do not have time to make time
consuming calculations. Therefore, we decided to adopt a semi-parametric approach,
and in particular the GMM.
5.2.2 Determination of optimal number of Gaussians for a GMM
We developed an algorithm (see Appendix C) to find the optimal number of Gaussians
in a GMM and applied it to the training data. The algorithm iterates over 1 to N
Gaussian components and for each set of Gaussians it fits a GMM to all collected
historical normalized prices, np, of the training set. New normalized price samples are
generated from each fitted GMM model via Monte-Carlo sampling, with the number
of new samples matching the original data size. Price histograms are generated using
the same bins for original and sampled data, and are compared with the help of
the KL-divergence ([Kullback and Leibler, 1951, Kullback, 1959])1. For each set of
Gaussians we iterate the resampling and the KL-divergence steps. Finally we calculate
the mean KL-divergence of all sets of Gaussians. The set with the minimum mean
KL-divergence is the set that most closely reproduces the original distribution.
The results of the optimization algorithm are shown in Figure 5.3, which shows the
mean KL-divergence of 10 fits for 4 to 25 Gaussians and their corresponding standard
deviations (left).
Figure 5.2.2 shows that the price density function, p(np), (right) estimated by the
GMM with 16 components fits well the historical normalized price data (left y-axis
represents good quantity) for a sample market. The optimal number of Gaussians for
this sample market is 24.
While the optimization algorithm suggests a choice of 24, the number of Gaussians’,
should reflect a balance between accuracy and computational overhead. We consider
mean prediction accuracy instead of accuracy of fit. Creating a model with a very
good fit to the observed data does not usually translate well into predictions. If the
model has too many degrees of freedom there is high likelihood of overfitting([Mitchell,
1997], [Russell and Norvig, 2002]). Therefore, we decided to take N = 16 Gaussians
to avoid overfitting the training data and better able to adapt to unseen instances.
1With the KL-divergence we are able to measure the closeness of two distributions. If the two
distributions are completely the same, then the KL-divergence is zero. A deeper discussion about
the KL-divergence can be found in Section 6.
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Figure 5.2: The price density density function, p(np), (right y-axis) estimated by the
GMM with 16 components fits well the historical normalized price data (left y-axis
represents good quantity) for the medium market segment. Data are from 18 games
from semi-finals and finals of TAC SCM 2005.
For N = 16 Gaussians the KL-value is around 0.01, which is close enough to have a
very good fit to the actual data. A similar approach was used by [Zhang and Cheung,
2005] and [Beygelzimer and Rish, 2003] to select an appropriate model that reduces
the computational complexity of graphical models in the medical domain.
5.2.3 Regime definition
Next, coming back to our regime method, we apply Bayes’ rule to determine the
posterior probability:
P (ζi|np) = p(np|ζi)P (ζi)∑N
i=1 p(np|ζi)P (ζi)
∀i = 1, · · · , N (5.9)
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Figure 5.3: Mean KL-divergence of 10 fits for 4 to 25 Gaussians and their correspond-
ing standard deviations. The KL-divergence values for one to three Gaussians are not
displayed since the values are much larger and would make it impossible to see the
KL-divergence values of the other Gaussians. The mean KL-divergence value for one
Gaussian equals 2.64, for two Gaussians equals 0.58, and for three Gaussians equals
0.44. Data are from 18 games from semi-finals and finals of TAC SCM 2005.
We then define the posterior probabilities of all Gaussians’ given a normalized price,
np, as the following N-dimensional vector:
~η(np) = [P (ζ1|np), P (ζ2|np), . . . , P (ζN |np)]. (5.10)
For each normalized price npj we compute the vector of the posterior normalized price
probabilities, ~η(npj), which is ~η evaluated at each observed normalized price npj.
The intuitive idea of a regime as a recurrent economic condition is captured by dis-
covering price distributions that recur across days. We define regimes by clustering
price distributions across days. This is done with the k-means algorithm, using a
similarity measure on the probability vectors ~η(npj) and normalized prices np. The
clusters found by this method correspond to frequently occurring price distributions
with support on contiguous range of np. We have found that sometimes data points
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corresponding to specific regimes are close in probability space, but not in price space.
Specifically it can happen that one regime dominates the extreme low and the extreme
high price range, with different regimes in between. This regime is more difficult to
interpret in terms of market concepts like oversupply or scarcity. To circumvent this
problem we perform clustering in an augmented space formed by appending a rescaled
version of np to the probability vector. Specifically, the mean of np is subtracted and
np is scaled so that its standard deviation matches the largest standard deviation of
the probability vectors.
The center of each cluster (ignoring the last component which contains the rescaled
price information) is a probability vector that corresponds to regime r = Rk for
k = 1, · · · ,M , where M is the number of regimes. We selected a priori the number
of regimes, after examining the data and looking at economic analyses of market
situations. In our experiments we found out that the number of regimes chosen does
not significantly affect the results on price trend predictions. We tried computing
the GMM and k-means clustering with different initial conditions, but consistently
converged to the same results.
Collecting these vectors into a matrix yields the conditional probability matrixP(c|r).
The matrix has N rows, one for each component of the GMM, and M columns, one
for each regime.
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Figure 5.4: Learned regime probabilities, P (Rk|np), over normalized price np, for a
sample market after training.
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In Figure 5.4 we distinguish five regimes, which we can call extreme oversupply (R1
or EO), oversupply (R2 or O), balanced (R3 or B), scarcity (R4 or S), and extreme
scarcity (R5 or ES). We decided to use five regimes instead of the three basic regimes
which are suggested by economic theory because in this way we are able to isolate
outlier regimes, such as extreme oversupply and extreme scarcity. Regimes R1 and R2
represent a situation where there is a glut in the market, i.e. an oversupply situation,
which depresses prices. Regimes R3 represents a balanced market situation, where
most of the demand is satisfied. In regime R3 the agent has a range of options of price
vs sales volume. Regimes R4 and R5 represent a situation where there is scarcity of
goods in the market, which increases prices. In this case the agent should price as
close as possible to the estimated maximum price a customer is willing to pay.
We marginalize the density of the normalized price, np, given the i-th Gaussian of
the GMM, p(np|ζi), and the conditional probability clustering matrix, P (ζi|Rk), over
all Gaussians ζi. We obtain the density of the normalized price np dependent on the
regime Rk:
p(np|Rk) =
N∑
i=1
p(np|ζi)P (ζi|Rk). (5.11)
The probability of regime Rk dependent on the normalized price np can be computed
using Bayes rule as:
P (Rk|np) = p(np|Rk)P (Rk)∑M
k=1 p(np|Rk)P (Rk)
∀k = 1, · · · ,M. (5.12)
where M is the number of regimes. The prior probabilities, P (Rk), of the different
regimes are determined by a counting process over past data. Figure 5.4 depicts
the regime probabilities for a sample market in TAC SCM. Each regime is clearly
dominant over a range of normalized prices.
The intuition behind regimes is that prices communicate information about future
expectations of the market. However, absolute prices do not mean much because the
same price point can be achieved in a static mode (i.e., when prices don’t change),
when prices are increasing, or when prices are decreasing. In the construction of
a regime the variation in prices (the nature, variance, and the neighborhood) are
considered thereby providing a better assessment of market conditions.
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5.3 Real time regime identification
Every day the agent receives a report which includes the minimum and maximum
prices of the computers sold the day before, but not the quantities sold. The mid-
range price, np, i.e. the price midway between the minimum and maximum, can be
used to approximate the mean price. However, this is not always an accurate estimate
of the mean price, because of local fluctuations in minimum and maximum prices.
and because the distribution of prices is not known, only the minimum and maximum
price.
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Figure 5.5: Minimum, maximum, mean, mid-range, and smoothed mid-range daily
normalized prices of computers sold, as reported during the game every day for the
medium market segment in the 3721@tac3, one of the final games. The mean price is
computed after the game using the game data, which include complete information
on all the transactions.
An example which shows how the mid-range value differs from the mean value is in
Figure 5.5. The mean value was computed after the game, when the entire game
data are available. In this example, especially on day 110, 120, 140 and at the end,
we observe a high spike in the maximum price. This was caused by an opportunistic
agent who discovered a small amount of unsatisfied demand, but most of that day’s
orders were sold at a much lower price. To lower the impact of sudden price changes
we implemented a Brown linear (i.e. double) exponential smoother ([Brown et al.,
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1961]) with α = 0.5. The general form of this smoother is:
n˜p′d−1 = α · npd−1 + (1− α) · n˜p′d−2 (5.13)
n˜p′′d−1 = α · n˜p′d−1 + (1− α) · n˜p′′d−2 (5.14)
where n˜p′ denotes the singly-smoothed mid-range normalized price series obtained by
applying simple exponential smoothing to mid-range normalized price np, and n˜p′′
denotes the doubly-smoothed normalized price series obtained by applying simple
exponential smoothing (using the same α) to n˜p′. We model yesterday’s smoothed
price estimate n˜pd−1 is given by:
n˜pd−1 = 2 · n˜p′d−1 − n˜p′′d−1 (5.15)
Finally, since we only have the minimum and maximum prices from the previous day
and not the mean, we model n˜pd−1 as follows:
n˜pd−1 =
n˜pmind−1 + n˜p
max
d−1
2
(5.16)
where n˜pmind−1 is the exponentially smoothed minimum normalized price and n˜p
max
d−1 is
the exponentially smoothed maximum normalized price from the previous day. This
results in a better approximation of the real mean price than smoothing only the mid-
range price from the previous day. Figure 5.5 shows that the smoothed mid-range
price, n˜p, is closer to the mean price.
During the game, on day d the agent estimates the current regime by calculating
the smoothed mid-range normalized price n˜pd−1 for the previous day (recall that the
agent every day receives the prices for the previous day) and by selecting the regime
which has the highest probability, i.e.
Rˆmax1 s.t.max1 = argmax
1≤k≤M
~P (Rˆk|n˜pd−1). (5.17)
Figure 5.6 shows how to use the smoothed mid-range price to identify the corre-
sponding regime probabilities online over the course of a game. The graph shows
that different regimes are dominant at different points in the game, and that there
are brief intervals during which two regimes are almost equally likely. An agent could
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use this information to decide which strategy, or mixture of strategies, to follow.
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Figure 5.6: Regime probabilities computed online every day for the medium market
segment in game 3721@tac3.
The smoothed mid-range price can be used to identify the corresponding regime in
real time, as shown in Figure 5.7 (right). The data are from game 3721@tac3, which
was not in the training set of games used to develop the regime definitions. The top
left, middle left, and bottom left parts of Figure 5.7 show respectively the probability
of receiving an order in an extreme scarcity, balanced and in an extreme over-supply
situation for different prices. Scarcity typically occurs early in the game and at other
times when supply is low. These probabilities are computed from past game data for
each regime.
A measure of the confidence in the regime identification is the entropy of the set S
of probabilities of the regimes given the normalized mid-range price from the daily
price reports n˜pday, where
S = {P (R1|n˜pd), · · · , P (RM |n˜pd)} (5.18)
and
Entropy(S) ≡
M∑
k=1
−P (Rk|n˜pd) log2 P (Rk|n˜pd) (5.19)
An entropy value close to zero corresponds to a high confidence in the current regime
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Figure 5.7: Game 3721@tac3 (Final TAC SCM 2005) – Regimes over time for the
medium market computed online every day (right), probability of receiving an order
by normalized price for an extreme scarcity situation (R5 indicated by ES) (top
left), for a balanced situation (R3 indicated by B) (middle left) and for an extreme
oversupply situation (R1 indicated by EO) (bottom left).
and an entropy value close to its maximum, i.e. for M regimes log2M , indicates that
the current market situation is a mixture of M almost equally likely regimes. An
example for the medium market segment in game 3721@tac3 is shown in Figure 5.8.
In Section 6.1.2 we develop an alternative measure for regime confidence, and a more
precise measure for regime uncertainty.
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Figure 5.8: Daily entropy values of the five regimes for the medium market segment
in game 3721@tac3. Notice how the entropy values match the regime probabilities
shown in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.9 (left) shows the percentage of the factory utilization (FU), the ratio of
offer to demand, which represents the portion of the market demand that is satisfied,
and the normalized price (np) over time. On the right side we display the quantity of
the unsold finished goods inventory (FG) instead of factory utilization2. The regimes
identified by our approach are superimposed, where ES (or R5) represents extreme
scarcity, S (or R4) scarcity, B (or R3) balanced, O (or R2) oversupply, and EO (or
R1) extreme oversupply. These factors clearly correlate with market regimes, but
they are not directly visible to the agent during the game. For example, the figure
shows that when the offer to demand ratio is high (i.e. oversupply) prices are low
and vice versa. We can observe that the ratio of offer to demand changes significantly
during the game. For instance, on day 111 the ratio of offer to demand is 1.95 and
prices are high. On day 208 the ratio of offer to demand is much higher, 5.38, and
prices are lower. We can also observe that prices tend to lag changes in ratio of offer
to demand.
We have reported results on correlation between regimes and market parameters
in [Ketter et al., 2005].
2The quantity of the finished goods inventory is affected by other factors, such as storage cost,
which have changed in the TAC SCM 2005 games. In 2005 and 2006 games agents tend to build to
order and keep most of their inventory in the form of parts, not finished products.
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Figure 5.9: Game 3721@tac3 (Final TAC SCM 2005) – Relationships between regimes
and normalized prices in the medium market. On the left axis, we show in the left
figure the daily factory utilization and in the right figure the available finished goods
inventory for all agents. In both figures we also display on the left axis the ratio
of offer to demand (which ranges from 0 to 5.38), which is scaled to fit between
the minimum and maximum values of the left axis. On the right axis we show the
normalized prices. The dominant regimes are labeled along the bottom.
5.4 Regime prediction
Since the behavior of the agent should depend not just on the current regime but
also on expected future regimes, the agent needs to predict future regimes. In this
Section we describe three different methods to generate regime predictions. The first
a Markov prediction process, the second is a Markov correction-prediction process,
and the last is based on exponential smoothing. Each of these methods has other
characteristics and should be used for different purposes. The exponential smoother
regime prediction process is an ideal candidate to estimate the current regime dis-
tribution, since it is more reactive to the current market condition than any other
method. The Markov prediction process is a good choice for short-term and mid-term
predictions, and the Markov correction-prediction process is suited more for long-term
predictions.
5.4.1 Markov prediction
We model the prediction of short-term future regimes for tactical decision making as
a Markov prediction process [Isaacson and Madsen, 1976]. The prediction is based
on the last price measurement.
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We construct a Markov transition matrix, T(rd+n|rd), off-line by a counting process
over past games. This matrix represents the posterior probability of transitioning on
day d+n to regime rd+n given the current regime on day d, rd. We distinguish between
two types of Markov prediction: (1) interval and (2) repeated 1-day prediction. The
interval prediction is based on training a separate Markov transition matrix for each
day in the planning horizon h, i.e. Tn(rd+n|rd), where ∀n = 1, · · · , h. The same type
of prediction can be done by repeating a single day prediction matrix, Th1(rd+1|rd),
rather than training an interval prediction matrix.
The prediction of the posterior distribution of regimes n days into the future,
~P (rˆd+n|{n˜pd−1}), is done recursively as follows:
1. Interval prediction:
~P (rˆd+h|{n˜pd−1}) =
∑
rd+h
. . .
∑
rd−1
{
~P (rˆd−1|{n˜pd−1}) ·Tn(rd+n|rd+n−1)
}
(5.20)
2. Repeated 1-day prediction:
~P (rˆd+h|{n˜pd−1) =
∑
rd+h
. . .
∑
rd−1
{
~P (rˆd−1|{n˜pd−1) ·Th+11 (rd|rd−1)
}
, (5.21)
where
Th+11 (rd|rd−1) =
h∏
n=0
T1(rd|rd−1) (5.22)
5.4.2 Markov correction-prediction
We model the prediction of long-term future regimes for strategic decision making as
a Markov correction-prediction process, where the prediction part is similar to the
Markov prediction described above but taking the entire price history into account.
The method is based on two distinct operations:
1. a correction (recursive Bayesian update) of the posterior probabilities for the
regimes based on the history of measurements of the smoothed mid-range nor-
malized price n˜p obtained since the time of the first measurement until the
previous day, d − 1. We use ~P (rˆd−1|{n˜p1, . . . , n˜pd−1}), to indicate a vector of
the posterior probabilities of all the regimes on day d− 1.
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2. a prediction of regime posterior probabilities for the current day, d. The
prediction of the posterior distribution of regimes n days into the future,
~P (rˆd+n|{n˜p1, . . . , n˜pd−1}), is done recursively as follows:
(a) Interval prediction:
~P (rd+h|{n˜p1, . . . , n˜pd−1})
=
∑
rd+h
. . .
∑
rd−1
{
~P (rd−1|{n˜p1, . . . , n˜pd−1}) ·Tn(rd+n|rd+n−1)
}
(5.23)
(b) Repeated 1-day prediction:
~P (rd+h|{n˜p1, . . . , n˜pd−1})
=
∑
rd+n
. . .
∑
rd−1
{
~P (rd−1|{n˜p1, . . . , n˜pd−1}) ·Th+11 (rd|rd−1)
}
, (5.24)
where
Th+11 (rd|rd−1) =
h∏
n=0
T1(rd|rd−1) (5.25)
On the first day in TAC SCM we set the prior regime probability to 100% extreme
scarcity, since all the agents start out with zero inventory on the first day. This has
a strong effect on pricing. Whoever has something to sell early on is able to sell it at
a high price.
5.4.3 Exponential smoother prediction
As an alternative to the Markov prediction process, we designed a method for regime
predictions based on exponentially smoothed price predictions. In Equations 5.13
to 5.16 we describe how to obtain an estimate of the smoothed mid-range price from
the previous day, n˜pd−1. As the first step in predicting prices we calculate the price
trend, trd−1, using the results from Equation 5.13 and Equation 5.14, as:
trd−1 =
α
1− α · (n˜p
′
d−1 − n˜p′′d−1) (5.26)
Since we estimate the smoothed mid-range price using the daily minimum and max-
imum price, see Equation 5.16, we have to do the same while calculating the trend
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estimate:
t˜rd−1 =
t˜r
min
d−1 + t˜r
max
d−1
2
(5.27)
where t˜r
min
d−1 is the exponentially smoothed minimum normalized trend and t˜r
max
d−1 is
the exponentially smoothed maximum normalized trend from the previous day. Using
the trend and yesterday’s price estimate, see Equation 5.16, we estimate today’s and
future daily smoothed prices as:
n˜pd+n = n˜pd−1 + (1 + n) · t˜rd−1, ∀n = 1, · · · , h (5.28)
We obtain the density of the normalized price, n˜pd+n, dependent on the regime Rk:
p(n˜pd+n|Rˆk) =
N∑
i=1
p(n˜pd+n|ζi)P (ζi|Rk). (5.29)
The predicted probability of regime Rk dependent on the predicted exponentially
smoothed normalized price n days into the future n˜pd+n can be computed using
Bayes rule as:
P (Rˆk|n˜pd+n) =
p(n˜pd+n|Rˆk)P (Rk)∑M
k=1 p(n˜pd+n|Rˆk)P (Rk)
∀k = 1, · · · ,M. (5.30)
where M is the number of regimes. The prior probabilities, P (Rk), of the differ-
ent regimes are determined by a counting process over past data after the k-means
clustering. We also developed a semi-Markov prediction process. Its description and
some results can be found in Appendix D.
Examples of regime predictions for game 3721@tac3 for the medium market segment
are shown in Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11. The figures show the real regimes measured
after the game from the game data and the predictions made by our method during
the game. As it can be seen in the figures, the match between predictions and real
data is very good.
Figure 5.10 shows a predicted change from an oversupply situation to a balanced sit-
uation. This means that the agent should sell less today and build up more inventory
for future days when prices will be higher. On the other hand we see in Figure 5.11 a
predicted change from scarcity to the balanced regime. In this case the agent should
try to sell more aggressively the current day, since prices will be decreasing in the
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Figure 5.10: Regime predictions for game
3721@tac3 starting on day 80 for 20 days
into the future for the medium market
segment. Data are shown as computed
after the game using the complete set of
data, and as predicted by our method
during the game.
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Figure 5.11: Regime predictions for game
3721@tac3 starting on day 110 for 30 days
into the future for the medium market
segment.
next days.
5.5 Prediction of price distribution and price trend
In this Section we describe a method for generating price trend prediction based on
regime prediction. An agent successful at price trend prediction can use this infor-
mation for guiding its procurement, production, and pricing decisions. Equation 5.31
describes a computation that calculates a price prediction distribution based on a
given predicted regime distribution. M represents the number of different regimes
and N the number of Gaussians used in the GMM (see Equation 5.7). A point
p(n̂pd+n|{n˜pd, . . . , n˜pd−1}) on the distribution, given a value for normalized price np,
is given by
p(n̂pd+n|{n˜p1, . . . , n˜pd−1}) =
M∑
i=1
p(np|Ri)P (Rˆi,d+n|{n˜p1, . . . , n˜pd−1})
=
N∑
j=1
M∑
i=1
P (ζj|Ri)P (Rˆi,d+n|{n˜p1, . . . , n˜pd−1})︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (ζj,d+n)
p(np|ζj)
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=
N∑
j=1
P (ζj,d+n) p(np|ζj), ∀n = 1, · · · , h (5.31)
where P (Rˆi,d+n|{n˜p1, . . . , n˜pd−1}) is one element of the predicted regime probability
vector given by Equations 5.21, 5.20, 5.24, and 5.23. To obtain a predicted price
distribution we sample Equation 5.31 for every day over the planning horizon h with
values for np between 0 and 1.25. Examples of price distributions are given in Fig-
ure 5.12 (left) and in Figure 5.13 (left).
After sampling the mixture distribution over the set of np values, the distribution
is renormalized to sum to one. This discretizes the continuous distribution, which
simplifies all subsequent probability calculations. For instance the mean of the dis-
tribution can be computed as:
E[n̂pd+n] =
Ns∑
j=1
pnorm
(
n̂pd+n(j)|{n˜p1, . . . , n˜pd−1}
)
· np(j), ∀n = 1, · · · , h (5.32)
To predict price trends we use also the 10%, 50%, and 90% percentile of the predicted
price distribution, which are interpolated from the discretized cumulative distribution.
Figure 5.12 (left) shows the forecast price density, based on a 1-day trained Markov
matrix, for game 3717@tac3, for 20 days starting at day 115. The dashed curve
represents the price density for the first forecast day, the thick solid line shows the
price density for the last forecast day, and the thin solid curves show the forecast
for the intermediate days. As expected the predicted price density broadens as we
forecast further into the future, reflecting a decreasing certainty in the prediction.
We can also compare the actual price trends with our predictions. Figure 5.12 (right)
shows the real mean price trend along with forecast price trends based on the different
predictors, the expected mean Markov prediction, the 10%, 50% and the 90% Markov
density percentiles, and the exponential smoother. All the curves in the figure rep-
resent a relative price trend – to better compare the different predictors which each
other graphically, we subtracted from each forecast value the first predicted value, so
that they all start at zero.
The exponential smoother prediction in this example is not good3, since the smoother
3Usually the exponential smoother predicts much better (see Section 6), but we use this example
to explain one of the advantages of our method.
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is too myopic, i.e. it puts a weight that is too high on recently observed prices.
Figure 5.5 shows that before day 115 the prices were increasing. When performing
a prediction the exponential smoother takes the recent slope and extrapolates it into
the future. On the contrary, our method learns during training how long, dependent
on the preconditions, a particular regime is active.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
0.05
Normalized Price [np]
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
De
ns
ity
 [p
(np
)]
Estimated Density Current Day
115 120 125 130 135
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
Day [t]
R
el
at
iv
e 
Pr
ic
e 
Tr
en
d
Real PT
Mean Markov PT
10% Markov PT
50% Markov PT
90% Markov PT
Exp Smoother PT
Figure 5.12: Predicted price density (left) and predicted price trend (right) using the
repeated 1-day trained Markov matrix for game 3717@tac3 from day 115 until day
135 in the low market segment. In the price density figure (left), the thick dashed
curve is the price density estimate for the current day, the thick black solid curve is
the price density estimate for the last day in the planning horizon, and the thin solid
curves are the estimates for the intermediate days.
Figure 5.13 (left) shows the forecast price density, based on a n-day trained Markov
matrix, for game 3717@tac3, for 20 days starting at day 115. We observe that the
predicted price density, which is generated using an n-day Markov matrix, broadens
much less than the one using a 1-day Markov matrix. This reflects an increasing
certainty in the prediction when switching from a 1-day to a n-day Markov matrix.
Figure 5.13 (right) shows the appropriate relative price trend. The increased certainty
in prediction is also reflected in the limits of the predicted density. The 10% and 90%
percentiles forming a good prediction envelope for the tracked price.
5.6 Prediction of order probability
Mathematically speaking the curves in Figure 5.1 represent different order probability
distribution functions P (order |np). Because np represents normalized order prices,
the cumulative density function CDF (np) describes the proportion of orders that will
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Figure 5.13: Predicted price density (left) and predicted price trend (right) using
n-day trained Markov matrix for game 3717@tac3 from day 115 until day 135 in the
low market segment.
be placed at or below a value of normalized price np.
P (order |np) = 1− CDF (np) (5.33)
Where the CDF is related to a probability density function p(np) (see Equation 5.31
and left side of Figures 5.12, 5.13) by
CDF (np) =
∫ np
0
p(np′) dnp′ (5.34)
in the TAC SCM case npmax = 1.25, so that CDF (npmax) = 1.
As an example, in Figure 5.14 we see the curve for P (order |np) = 1 − CDF (np)
corresponding to the estimated current day density shown as the dashed curve in
Figures 5.12 and 5.13 (left side).
59
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Normalized Price [np]
O
rd
er
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity
 [%
]
Markov C−P
Markov P
Exp Smoother
Figure 5.14: Real-time order probability curve, P (order |np) = 1−CDF (np), for day
115 for the low market segment in game 3717@tac3.
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Chapter 6
Performance Evaluation
A critical element of a trading agent is the determination of the current market
prices, probability of order, prediction of prices, price trends, resource allocation, and
setting of sales prices. We have presented methods in Chapters 4 and 5 to facilitate
tactical and strategic decision via economic regimes. In this Chapter we focus on the
evaluation of those methods.
We begin by presenting compelling off-line results in the TAC SCM domain. Since all
our explanations so far were based on market segments we continue this in our off-line
experiments. We selected market segments over products because the movements of
markets, e.g. the movement of the low end computers vs high end computers, are
more intuitive than individual products, and a company can make decisions on an
entire market instead of individual products. In the second part of this Chapter, we
will cover the real-time experiments. We have implemented our methods in a real
agent, MinneTAC. Since the supply for individual products in one market segment
may vary, we implemented our methods for this set of experiments at the product
level. This makes the agent more reactive to the supplier market. Finally, we present
an application of economic regimes to financial markets and we are also able to show
compelling results in this domain.
6.1 TAC SCM - Off-line
Our method is useful to the extent that it characterizes and predicts real qualities of
the market. There are many hidden variables in a competitive market, such as the
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inventory positions and procurement arrangements of the competitors. Our method
uses observable historical and current data to guide tactical and strategic decision
processes. In this Section we evaluate the practical value of regime identification,
prediction and the estimation of order probability in TAC SCM.
6.1.1 Experimental setup
For our experiments, we used data from a set of 28 games (18 for training1 and 10
for testing2) played during the semi-finals and finals of TAC SCM 2005. The mix of
players changed from game to game, the total number of players was 12 in the semi-
finals and 6 in the finals. Since supply and demand in TAC SCM change in each of
the market segments (low, medium, and high) independently of the other segments,
our method is applied to each individual market segment. Each type of computer
has a nominal cost, which is the sum of the nominal cost of each of the parts needed
to build it. In TAC SCM the cost of the facility is sunk, and there is no per-unit
assembly cost. We normalize the prices across the different computer types in each
market segment.
6.1.2 Identification of regime uncertainty
An automated agent can use the entire daily estimated regime distribution as input
to other algorithms to facilitate decision making. On the contrary a human decision
maker might just want to have an estimate of the daily dominant regime to get a
quick and intuitive estimate of the current market condition.
For each training game we calculate everyday the 1-norm between the estimated daily
online regime probability and the actual off-line regime probability. After all games
are processed we compute the RMS error between online and the off-line regime prob-
abilities over 2% probability bins from 0% to 100%. The off-line regime probability
is calculated based on the actual price on a given day, where the estimated online
regime probabilities are based on price estimates and Markov matrices. During train-
ing we used a Markov prediction, a Markov correction-prediction, and an exponential
13694@tac3, 3700@tac3, 4229@tac4, 4234@tac4, 7815@tac5, 7821@tac5, 5638@tac6, 5639@tac6,
3719@tac3, 3720@tac3, 3721@tac3, 3722@tac3, 3723@tac3, 4255@tac4,4256@tac4, 4257@tac4,
4258@tac4, 4259@tac4 – To obtain the complete path name append .sics.se to each game num-
ber.
23697tac3, 4235tac4, 7820tac5, 5641tac6, 3717tac3, 3718tac3, 3724tac3, 4253tac4, 4254tac4,
4260tac4
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smoother process to calibrate different online regime probability estimates.
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Figure 6.1: RMS Error for identification of daily regime probabilities based on the
training data.
Figure 6.1 presents the RMS error in the daily regime probability identification for
the three predictors. From the Figure we can determine that the Markov prediction
process has the lowest error in identifying the current regime probabilities followed by
the exponential smoother process and last the Markov correction-prediction process.
This results make sense, since the Markov prediction process is myopic and therefore
relies strongly on the current market situation, tactical decision, whereas the Markov
correction-prediction process is designed for long-term, strategic decision.
Our online approach to signal regime uncertainty is based on using the learned look-
up table for each identified regime probability to determine the appropriate RMS
regime probability error. We subtract the error, Err(P (Rˆmax1)), from the probabil-
ity of Rˆmax1, which is the regime with the highest probability, and add the error,
Err(P (Rˆmax2)), to the probability of Rˆmax2, the regime with the 2nd highest prob-
ability, and take the difference between them. If the difference is positive, which
means that the error regions don’t cross, than there is no uncertainty in the regime
identification, otherwise there is as expressed. Please see the following Equation 6.1
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for details:
RU =

0 if {P (Rˆmax1)− Err(P (Rˆmax1))}
−{P (Rˆmax2)) + Err(P (Rˆmax2))} ≤ 0
P(Rˆmax2)
P(Rˆmax1)
otherwise
(6.1)
In addition we have defined regime confidence as:
RC =
P (Rˆmax1)
P (Rˆmax2)
(6.2)
The top row of Figure 6.2 shows regime confidence, RC, results and the bottom row
shows regime uncertainty, RU , results for game 3717tac3 for the low market segment.
The left two quadrants of Figure 6.2 were generated using a Markov prediction process
and the two quadrants to the right using an exponential smoother process. We observe
that in testing, as we did in training, on a daily basis the Markov prediction process
has less uncertainty than the exponential smoother process in identifying the current
dominant regime.
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Figure 6.2: Game 3717@tac3 - low market segment: Uncertainty in the identification
of the daily dominant regime based on Markov prediction process (left) vs exponential
smoother regime prediction (right).
6.1.3 Relationship between identified regime and market variables
We expect identified regimes to qualitatively represent the status of important hidden
market factors. A correlation analysis of market parameters of the training set is
shown in Figure 6.3. The p-values for the correlation analysis are all less than 0.01.
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Regime EO (extreme oversupply) correlates positively with quantity of finished goods
inventory, negatively with percent of factory utilization, positively with the ratio of
offer to demand, and negatively with normalized price. On the other hand, in Regime
ES (extreme scarcity) we observe a negative correlation with the amount of unsold
finished goods inventory, with the percent of factory utilization, and the ratio of offer
to demand, and positively with normalized price.
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Figure 6.3: Training set (18 games) – Correlation coefficients between regimes and
quantity of finished goods inventory, factory utilization, the ratio of offer to demand,
and normalized price (np) in the medium market segment. All values are significant
at the p = 0.01 level.
An advantage of using five regimes instead of three regimes is that we gain two
degrees of freedom. This enables better decision making, by isolating the outliers in
the market. For example, regime EO (extreme oversupply) is different from Regime
O (oversupply) since it presents a potential price war situation. Another difference
between regime EO and regime O is that regime EO is universally unprofitable
and that regime O is marginally profitable for most agents. Regimes B and S are
universally profitable and in regime ES some agents have left the market. The major
difference between the scarcity regime, S, and the extreme scarcity regime, ES, is
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that in regime S the factory runs at full capacity, because of excess demand, while
in regime ES we observe a scarcity of parts, which results in underutilization of the
production capacity.
Another way to evaluate the quality of regime identification is given by an interpre-
tation of the k-means clustering algorithm. Essentially, it finds points along the path
that connects the regime centers in the regime probability space. In Figure 6.4 we
represent the results of the k-means clustering algorithm, or the learned regime prob-
abilities. For ease of visualization we use only three regimes to explain the learned
behavior; the five regime case produces similar results, but they are harder to visu-
alize. We can see that the learned regime probabilities in the posterior probability
space connect the regimes in the “expected” way. In other words, we do not see
points directly between scarcity and oversupply; instead, the path leads from scarcity
through balance to oversupply.
[0 0 1]
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[1 0 0]
O
[0 1 0]
B
P(R|np)
Figure 6.4: An example of learned regime probabilities, P (Rk|np), for the medium
market segment in TAC SCM after training.
We expect a dynamic regime prediction algorithm to move along this path of learned
regime probabilities.
6.1.4 Prediction of dominant regime
We measure the accuracy of regime prediction by counting how many times the regime
predicted is the correct one. As ground truth we measure the number of regime
switches and when they happen off-line using data from the game. Starting with
day 1 until day 179, we forecast every day the regimes for the next 40 days and
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we forecast when a regime transition would occur. Experimental results for discrete
regime change prediction are shown in Figure 6.5 using a 1-day (left) vs a n-day
(right) Markov matrix. We observe that when using a n-day as opposed a 1-day
Markov matrix, the prediction accuracy increases on average about 10% in all market
segments starting from 15 days into the future.
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Figure 6.5: Success rate of correct regime shift prediction using a 1-day (left) vs a
n-day (right) Markov matrix.
6.1.5 Prediction of regime distribution
The above results are based on discrete regimes, i.e., using only the dominant regime
of each predicted day to the actual value of any given day. One measure which can be
used in determining the closeness of all individual predicted regime probabilities to
the actual ones is called the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [Kullback and Leibler,
1951, Kullback, 1959]. This is a quantity which measures the difference between
two probability distributions in bits, meaning the smaller the measure the closer
the predictions are to optimal. We can calculate the Kullback-Leibler divergence,
KL(~P (Rˆ)‖ ~P (R)) as:
KL(~P (Rˆ)‖ ~P (R)) = ∑
r∈R
~P (Rˆ) log
 ~P (Rˆ)
~P (R)
 (6.3)
The KL difference can be interpreted in terms of how much additional data is needed
to achieve optimal prediction performance. The precision of this data is given by
the number of bits in the KL-divergence measure. For example a 1 bit difference
would require an additional binary piece of information [Shannon, 1948], like: “Were
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yesterday’s bids all satisfied?” If the difference between the two distributions is 0
than the predictions are optimal in sense that the predicted and actual distributions
match.
If the time-dependent distribution of a Markov process, in our case ~P (Rˆ), converges
to a limit
~Π = lim
m→∞
{ ~P (Rˆ)}m (6.4)
then Π is called the stationary distribution. When the stationary distribution exists
it is characterized by the fix-point equation
~Π = ~Π ·Tn (6.5)
There are several ways to compute the stationary distribution, Π, but all involve
solving the eigenvalue problem specified in the above equation. The reason for intro-
ducing the n-day Markov matrix is that we hypothesized that it takes longer to reach
the stationary distribution of its Markov process than opposed a 1-day Markov ma-
trix, and therefore deliver a better prediction performance. We prove this hypothesis
empirically by calculating the stationary distribution for the 1-day and each n-day
Markov matrix and compare it with Markov predicted regime distribution. For this
we utilize again the KL-divergence measure:
KL(~P (Rˆ)‖~Π) = ∑
r∈R
~P (Rˆ) log
 ~P (Rˆ)
~Π
 (6.6)
In Figure 6.6 we show prediction results in terms of KL-divergence for a GMM with
16 components using a 1-day Markov matrix (left) vs using a n-day Markov matrix
(right). The KL-divergences are computed using 5 regimes for the low market seg-
ment over the testing set. Points represent the KL-divergences between the Markov
predicted regime distribution and the actual distribution, KL(~P (Rˆ)Markov‖ ~P (R)).
Diamonds represent the KL-divergences between the double exponentially smoothed
predicted distribution and the actual distribution KL(~P (Rˆ)ExpS‖ ~P (R)), and pluses
represent the KL-divergences between the Markov predicted regime distribution, and
the stationary distribution KL(~P (Rˆ)Markov‖~Π) over the planning horizon.
Our predictions differ between 0.28 bits (current day), 0.80 bits (20 days), and 0.95
bits (40 days) of information when using the repeated 1-day Markov matrix, and
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Figure 6.6: KL-divergence between predicted, actual, and stationary regime distri-
bution using a repeated 1-day (right) vs n-day (left) Markov matrix. KL-divergence
between the Markov predicted regime distribution and the actual distribution (point),
the double exponentially smoothed predicted distribution and the actual distribution
(diamond), and the Markov predicted regime distribution,and the stationary distri-
bution (plus) over the planning horizon. KL-divergences computed using five regimes
for the low market segment over the testing set. The left figure is generated using a
repeated 1-day trained Markov matrix and the right figure with n-day trained Markov
matrices.
between 0.28 bits (current day), 0.66 bits (20 days), and 0.81 bits (40 days) of infor-
mation when using the n-day interval Markov matrix, as opposed to the Exponential
Smoother predictions which vary between 0.09 bits (current day), 3.55 bits (20 days),
and 12.62 bits (40 days). It is typically acceptable having a KL-divergence less than
or close to one [Zhang and Cheung, 2005]. There will not be significant gains by
obtaining more information in the estimation procedure. We only show values of
KL-divergences up to 4, since we want to highlight the initial exponential smoother
and the Markov predictions. The current day exponential smoother predictions are
approximately 1.14 times better as the repeated 1-day and n-day interval Markov pre-
dictions. On the other hand the 20 and 40 days exponential smoother predictions are
approximately 6.73 and 3259 times worse than the repeated 1-day Markov predictions
and 7.42 and 3591 times worse than the n-day interval Markov predictions.
The KL-divergences calculated using the n-day interval Markov matrix are always
smaller than the one using a repeated 1-day Markov matrix, especially in the long-
term. This indicates a better fit between the predicted and the actual regime prob-
abilities for the n-day interval Markov matrix and as a consequence should be used
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for strategic decision making as opposed to the predictions generated by the repeated
1-day Markov matrix. The best estimate for the short-term (current day up to 4 days
into the future) is given by the exponential smoother and as a result should be used as
an input to generate the price densities for the short-term (explained in Section 5.5)
and sales offer prices for the current day, i.e. for tactical decision making.
6.1.6 Price distribution
Every day we forecast the price density for the next n days into the future, where
p(n̂pd)
3 is the predicted price density for the current day, and p(n̂pd+n) is the predicted
price density on the n-day into the future of the planning horizon h. In our experi-
ments we choose h = 40. We calculated the expected mean price (see Equation 5.32),
and track different areas (10%, 50%, and 90%) of the price density curve. We fur-
thermore calculated the expected mean price using exponential smoother regime and
density prediction and the pure exponential smoother price prediction. We calcu-
late the root mean square error, RMSE(n̂pn, npn), between the predicted normalized
price, n̂pn, and the actual normalized price, npn, over a prediction interval, n, be-
tween the current day and the end of the planning horizon, h, averaged across days
and games, to determine the accuracy of the price prediction as:
RMSE(n̂pn, npn) =
√√√√√√
NG∑
γ=1
ND−n∑
d=1
(n̂pn,γd − npn,γd )2
NG · (ND − n) , ∀n = 1, · · · , h (6.7)
where ND is the length of a TAC SCM game in days and NG is the number of test
games.
Figure 6.7 shows the RMS error of the Markov predictors using a repeated 1-day
matrix (left) vs an interval matrix (right) and compares it to the RMS error of the
price generated by exponential smoother regime lookup and to the pure implementa-
tion of the exponential smoother. An RMS error of 0.05 corresponds to an average
prediction error of 4% and an RMS error of 0.25 corresponds to an average prediction
error of 20%. We observe that when switching from a repeated 1-day to a n-day
interval Markov matrix the overall price prediction using the density improves, espe-
cially at the limits of the distribution. Looking at the n-day interval Markov matrix
3For simplicity we leave out the dependence on historical normalized prices.
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results shows that on the current day the pure exponential smoother is doing best
when compared to the real mean price and on the second day the pure exponential
smoother and the price prediction using regime lookup via the exponential smoother
is the best. Since the differences in terms of price prediction between the pure ex-
ponential smoother and the regime look-up via exponential smoother are so small
we think it is best to go with the predicted price density generated via exponential
smoothed regime look-up, since you have the whole price density available to make
an informed decision instead only having the mean price. From day 3 until the end
of the planning horizon the expected mean and median Markov price predictions are
the best and about the same in quality, followed by the 10% and 90% Markov price
predictions, followed by the predicted price using regime lookup via the exponential
smoother and last on all the days is the price prediction by the pure implementation
of the exponential smoother.
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Figure 6.7: RMS price prediction error based on a repeated 1-day (left) vs n-day
interval (right) trained Markov matrix.
We tested whether the Markov correction-prediction predicted normalized prices, n̂pn,
were different from the actual observed prices, npn, for any day, n, in the planning
horizon, h, using a pairwise T-test and failed to reject the equality of price hypothesis
at p = 0.05 significance level. This indicates that our predicted prices, n̂pn, are
statistically following the real prices npn.
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6.1.7 Price trend
To obtain the price trend, for every day, n, over the planning horizon, h, we take the
forecast from the different predictors and apply it to compute:
T̂rn = sgn(n̂pd+n − n̂pd), ∀n = 1, · · · , h (6.8)
where T̂rn represents the price trend for n days into the future, n̂pd is the predicted
price for the current day, and n̂pd+n is the predicted price (a point on the predicted
price distribution, e.g. in our examples 10%, 50%, and 90%) n number of days into
the future. Each day the agent has access only to the minimum and maximum prices
of the previous day, so it needs a one day forecast to estimate the price for the current
day. If T̂rn is positive, then the predicted prices are increasing, and if T̂rn is negative,
then predicted prices are decreasing. Otherwise we predict prices will remain stable
at the current level.
Figure 6.8 displays the success rate of price trend sign prediction using a repeated 1-
day Markov matrix (left) and a n-day interval Markov matrix (right) over the planning
horizon. Since the price trend is used for tactical decision making, we calculate the
success rate only after five days in the future. We observe that the n-day interval
Markov correction-prediction process forms a nice line along the 70% success rate and
outperforms the Markov prediction process in terms of predicting correctly the sign
of the price trend.
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Figure 6.8: Success-rate of price trend sign prediction based on repeated 1-day (left)
vs n-day interval (right) trained Markov matrices.
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Often (especially in the short-term) applying a n-day interval trained Markov matrix
results in better performance in terms of predicting falling or rising prices compared
to the repeated 1-day trained Markov matrix. The reason for the behavior might
be that any prediction further out than one day needs to be estimated by the 1-day
trained Markov matrix which is is multiplied n-times, whereas the n-day interval
trained Markov matrix is based on actual observed regime changes. Each time we
apply the 1-day trained Markov matrix to itself the uncertainty in regime prediction
increases.
Next, we analyze the sensitivity of the price trend prediction when using a different
number of regimes and compare it to results obtained using an additional prediction
method, which we call “Q Bayes Net.”
To evaluate the quality of the predictions, we compare the performance of regime-
based price trend prediction with two “baseline” methods, one which is based on
predicted demand, the other based on an exponential smoother. The demand-based
predictor is based on the economic theory that prices are influenced by demand. For
TAC SCM, customer demand is generated by a random walk algorithm, as specified
in [Collins et al., 2004]. We can use a Bayesian inversion of this algorithm to predict
demand, as shown in [Kiekintveld et al., 2004]. In Table 6.1, this prediction is labeled
“Q Bayes Net.” The exponential predictor is based on a Brown’s linear (i.e., double)
exponential smoother with α = 0.5. In Table 6.1, this prediction is labeled “Exp
Smoother.” The other predictors are the 5%, 10% and 50% percentiles of the Markov
model.
For the experiments. every day we forecast the price trend for the next 20 days,
using Equation 6.8. The experiments used the training and testing data sets specified
earlier. In addition to the baseline comparison, we explored the parameter space in
two dimensions: the number of regimes used, and the percentile on the predicted price
distribution used to determine the price trend. The “Success Rate” for our prediction
method is computed using Equation 6.8. The price trend prediction is successful when
the predictor’s forecast price trend has the same sign as the real price trend.
A surprising outcome that can be seen in Table 6.1 is that customer demand is not
a strong predictor (around 50% to 57%), contrary to our initial assumption. We can
see that price trend predictions based on regimes outperform predictions based on
demand projection by a significant margin. Across all market segments our prediction
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Success Rate (%)
Predictors Market
Segment Number of Regimes
3 5
Q Bayes Net Low 54.93 54.93
Exp Smoother Low 66.66 66.66
5 % Markov Low 71.23 71.04
10 % Markov Low 70.95 71.32
50 % Markov Low 67.32 66.48
Q Bayes Net Medium 57.45 57.45
Exp Smoother Medium 66.66 66.66
5 % Markov Medium 70.67 68.34
10 % Markov Medium 71.23 68.99
50 % Markov Medium 72.25 67.78
Q Bayes Net High 56.70 56.70
Exp Smoother High 67.22 67.22
5 % Markov High 69.46 70.39
10 % Markov High 70.11 73.18
50 % Markov High 71.14 70.48
Mean Markov All 70.48 70.00
Table 6.1: Prediction results on the testing set of games from day 1 to day 179 (for
a total of 1074 trials) with a 20 day forecast horizon, i.e. the last day of a forecast is
day 199.
methods outperforms the stable and Q Bayes net prediction results. We can also see
that the prediction quality is not especially sensitive to the number of regimes used or
to the chosen percentile on the predicted distribution. Figure 6.9 depicts the success
rate for the different predictors over a varying planning horizon up to 50 days into
the future for the high market segment.
We tested whether the Markov predictions were different from actual observed price
trends using pairwise Binomial hypothesis test and failed to reject the equality of
trends hypothesis at p = 0.01 significance level. This indicates that our predictions
are statistically following the same trend as the real price trends.
Finally, we tested the influence of different training and clustering methods on price
trend predictions. As an alternative training method we used all order prices on a
given day to determine the dominant regime instead of only the mean price, and as a
second clustering method we used a hard version of the kmeans clustering algorithm
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Figure 6.9: Success rate over the planning horizon over the test set of games for the
high market segments. These are computed off-line from games out of the training
set.
called kmns [McCallum and Nigam, 1988]. The results of these experiments are listed
in Table 6.2.
We expected the results of the experiments which were trained with all order prices
to have a higher success rate than the one with just the mean prices, but the results
are almost equal and the training method does not appear to have a strong influence.
Furthermore, the different clustering methods did not influence the result strongly.
Across all market segments our prediction method outperforms Bayes net prediction
results. We tested the significance between prediction success rates using a pairwise
Binomial hypothesis test and recored a significance at the p = 0.01 level.
6.1.8 Prediction error
We also measured the prediction error for the price distributions generated by our
model. Because the mixture of Gaussians can only approximate the true price dis-
tributions, we measured the difference between observed price frequencies and model
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Success Rate (%)
Clustering Method
Predictors Market kmeans kmns
Segment Training Method
mean price all prices mean price all prices
Q Bayes Net Low 52.89 52.89 52.89 52.89
5 % Markov Low 68.99 69.09 69.09 68.99
10 % Markov Low 68.72 68.90 69.09 68.72
Q Bayes Net Medium 50.37 50.37 50.37 50.37
5 % Markov Medium 66.20 66.48 66.57 65.92
10 % Markov Medium 66.20 66.01 66.20 65.92
Q Bayes Net High 56.61 56.61 56.61 56.61
5 % Markov High 74.12 73.84 75.42 75.88
10 % Markov High 74.21 74.30 74.67 75.79
Table 6.2: Prediction results based on the testing set of games from day 1 to day 179
(altogether 1074 trials) with a 20 day forecast horizon, i.e. the last day of a forecast
is day 199. On average prediction results that differ by more than 5% are significant
at the p = 0.01 level given the sample size.
predictions using a Monte Carlo method. In particular, price frequencies were com-
puted for 64 bins from game data to form an empirical histogram. Simulated price
data was sampled from the mixture model and binned as per real data. Prediction
error was defined as the 1-norm (sum of absolute differences) distance between sim-
ulated and measured histograms, averaged across 1000 simulated data samples. In
Figure 6.10 we present the algorithm used to analyze price predictions when sampling
from the learned GMM with 16 and 25 components. Table 6.3 displays the results
for the fitted GMMs.
low market medium market high market # Gaussians
Prediction Error in % 6.69 6.89 8.99 16
Prediction Error in % 5.75 5.48 5.95 25
Table 6.3: Overall prediction error for a 16 and a 25 GMM in the three market
segments. Results were obtained after averaging over 1000 iterations.
The results show that the total error introduced by the mixture model approximation
varied between 5%− 8%, with more components resulting in slightly lower errors.
76
1 Inputs:
2 pnpavg: original normalized price density
3 numBins: the number of histogram bins
4 numNP : number of np in the training set
5 GMM : learned Gaussian Mixture Model
6 maxIter: number of iterations
7 Output:
8 PredErr: the overall mean prediction error
9 Process:
10 for j = 1 until maxIter
11 pnpsamp = Monte Carlo Sampling(GMM ,numNP)
12 Error(j) =
|pnpavg−pnpsamp|
numBins
13 end
14 meanErr = Error
15 PredErr = numBins ·∑meanErr
16 return PredErr
Figure 6.10: Prediction error algorithm.
6.1.9 Order probability
We verify the goodness of the current day order probability estimation by determining
the normalized prices, np, which represent 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 90% of the area
under the cumulative distribution function (see Equation 5.34). If the estimated cu-
mulative distribution function is correct, i.e. mirroring the current market condition,
then this should directly translate into 90%, 75%, 50%, 25%, and 10% daily order
probability (see Equation 5.33). Next, we determine off-line how many auctions we
would have won on each day if we had bid those estimated prices.4 If we take the
percentage of the winning auctions to the overall auctions we get the actual order
probability for each of those prices. For our experiment we estimated 2200 (10 games
times 220 days) order probability curves for a sample market. Figure 6.11 shows the
results of the experiments for the Markov correction-prediction, the Markov predic-
tion, and the exponential smoother process. The y-axis shows the estimated order
probability, and the bar graphs show the actual mean order probability and their
standard deviations. We observe that all three predictors estimate the daily order
probability well. Furthermore we observe, that the Markov correction-prediction pro-
cess estimates the higher order probabilities, 75% and 90%, better than the Markov
4In TAC SCM customers always buy from the cheapest manufacturer agent.
77
np(10%) np(25%) np(50%) np(75%) np(90%)
10%
25%
50%
75%
90%
Normalized Price by Density Percentile
Es
tim
at
ed
 O
rd
er
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity
 w
ith
 E
rro
rb
ar
s Markov C−P
Markov P
Exp Smoother
Figure 6.11: Daily order probability estimation (mean/std) for the 10th, 25th, 50th,
75th, and 90th percentile using different predictors.
prediction and the exponential smoother process, but performs a little less in the
lower percentiles of the order probability estimation.
6.2 TAC SCM - Real-time
In the previous Section we evaluated our approach on data which are available from
the game servers after the games have been played. In this Section we evaluate our
methods in the context of playing against five other agents during a game in real-
time. We focus on regime identification and prediction at the individual product
level instead of the market segment, as described in the previous Section. This allows
an agent to be more reactive in the supplier market, e.g. the market segment of a
particular product might be in an over-supply situation, but one product might miss
a part and therefore it is in a scarcity situation, which has a totally different impact
on sales prices.
6.2.1 Experimental setup
We implemented all three regime identification and prediction methods, i.e. Markov
prediction (MP), Markov correction-prediction (MCP), and exponential smoother
lookup (ExpS) process, with the help of evaluators, as mentioned in Section 3.2.
More details on evaluators are in [Collins et al., 2007]. We also designed a training
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data evaluator which is shared (superclass) by the individual regime evaluators (sub-
classes). The training data evaluator reads in the configuration of the regime classes,
e.g. 3 vs 5 regimes, which type of training data to use, median vs mean prediction,
etc. and reads in the appropriate off-line learned training data files before the be-
ginning of the game. The different regime evaluators inherit the training data and
update them separately during a game. Figure 6.12 shows the chain of the evaluators
used to make offer prices.
allocation simple−price
available−factory−capacity
available−supply randomized−price
cost−basis
effective−demand
demand
future−demand
Markov Regimes
price−error
Regime Training Data
Exp Smoother Regimes
price−follower Regime Price Trend Adapter median−price order−probability
Figure 6.12: Evaluator chain for sales quota and pricing using regimes to determine
prices, price trends and order probability.
The agents we use for our experiments have been obtained from the TAC SCM agent
repository5. We selected five of the finalists from the 2006 competition and an agent
from the 2005 competition. The agents are:
1. DeepMaize – University of Michigan
2. Maxon – Xonar Inc
3. MinneTAC – University of Minnesota
4. PhantAgent – Politechnica University of Bucharest
5. RationalSCM – Australian National University; competed in 2005.
5
http://www.sics.se/tac/showagents.php
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6. TacTex – University of Texas; winner TAC SCM 2006
Agent performance in TAC SCM is affected not only by the set of agents playing
together but also by random variations in supply, demand, and other market pa-
rameters. To compare different variations of our own agent without having to run
a very large number of games, we use the controlled server [Borghetti et al., 2006,
Sodomka et al., 2007] which has been developed as a tool to evaluate agents. The
controlled server allows for repeatable pseudo-random sequences of any individual
market factor or combination of factors.
We run NG games, each with a different pseudo-random sequence, using MinneTAC,
and then run NG games with the same market factors (the same set of NG pseudo-
random sequences) this time using a different version of our agent, MinneTAC’. In
other words, all the pseudo-random sequences in the first set ofNG games are repeated
in the second set ofNG games. For our tests, we choseNG = 23. This method removes
the profit variability due to the agents seeing different market conditions, and, at the
same time, allows for testing multiple variations of our agent, one for each set of
games. In this way our agent plays always against five different agents, and not
against its onw clone(s).
Each version of our MinneTAC agent uses a different technique for tactical decisions
(order probability calculation) and for strategic decisions (price and price trend pre-
diction).
At the strategic level we distinguish three different price prediction methods. The
first one uses a price-following method, the second one uses regimes (as described is
Section 5.5), and the third one (called Combo in Table 6.4) also uses regimes, but
reverts to a price-following method if the agent identifies a “price war” situation, i.e.
an extreme over-supply regime. The reason for this combination predictor is based
on our hypothesis that in a extreme-oversupply regime we are faced with a mismatch
between the training data and the actual game data. This means in particular that
we might observe prices in extreme-oversupply regimes during actual games which are
by far lower than the prices we observed during the economic regime training phase.
As a consequence during actual games the regime price prediction might, after some
days, point toward higher prices again, whereas the exponential smoother predictor
will simply follow the actual prices, which in extreme-oversupply are just a low flat
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price line.
At the tactical level we differentiate two methods to calculate order probability, one
based on a linear interpolation between the estimated minimum and maximum good
prices and the other based on regimes (as described is Section 5.6).
6.2.2 Real-time results
Our tests includes eight sets of twenty-three games each, one set for each different
configuration of our MinneTAC agent, using the same twenty-three pseudo-random
sequences for each set. For each method we compare the difference in profit, and
compute the standard error associated with each mean difference. As the primary
measure of agent performance we list in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 the mean total
profit per agent over a game. From Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 we see that MinneTAC
when playing with this set of agents always comes in fifth, but for the purpose of
testing the different configurations of MinneTAC, we are only interested in its relative
performance.
The results of the different experiments are as follows:
1. In the first experiment MinneTAC uses a linear interpolation to determine the
probability of order and an exponential smoother to predict price trends. Min-
neTAC reaches a final mean profit of 1.347 million.
2. The configuration of the second experiment uses economic regimes (based on
a repeated 1-day Markov prediction) to predict price trends instead of the ex-
ponential smoother predictor. The final result of this combination amounts to
1.813 million. We already reported before that price predictions generated by
economic regime have a higher accuracy and a smaller error in terms of the root
mean square price error, but now we have also empirically shown that regime
price predictions outperform exponential smoother predictions in terms of final
mean profit.
3. In the third experiment we test if our hypothesis that a combination predictor
consisting of economic regimes and exponential smoother beats an agent which
uses pure regime price predictions. Since the final profit of MinneTAC for this
experiment amounts to 1.780 million we have to reject our hypothesis, and
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conclude that it is better to use regime price predictions in all different market
conditions. The resulting small profit difference between experiment two and
three makes intuitively sense, since in an extreme over-supply situation there is
hardly any profit to be made, and it is more important to control losses than
to make profit.
4. Our fourth experiment uses regimes for tactical decisions (determination of
order probability based on exponentially smoothed predicted regimes) and for
strategic decisions (price and price trend prediction based on a repeated 1-day
Markov matrix). The final mean profit for this experiment is 2.017 million and
beats in that respect all other combinations.
5. Experiment five uses a Markov n-day interval prediction to determine price
trends. Its final mean profit comes to 1.567 million. This result shows a differ-
ence when predicting aggregate vs individual product data. We expected that in
real-time the Markov n-day interval prediction would outperform the repeated
1-day Markov prediction as reported in Section 6.1.6, but the outcome of our
experiments shows that a repeated 1-day Markov prediction performs better in
terms of final profit than a Markov n-day interval prediction. The reason could
be that off-line we use for every day in the planning horizon a separately trained
Markov matrix, but since we only have limited time during a game in real-time
we use only a 1, 10, and 20 day Markov prediction matrix. Then we perform
regime and price density predictions for these three matrices and interpolate
the missing prices between them. Here we make the assumption that the prices
in between are related linearly to each other, which is most likely not the case,
since we actually expect prices to flatten out further into the future.
6. In the sixth experiment we use a Markov correction-prediction with a repeated
1-day Markov matrix to determine the price trends. The final mean profit
amounts to 1.889 million. This outcome fits our observation on the market
segment level, where the Markov prediction method outperforms the Markov
correction-prediction method.
7. The seventh experiment uses a Markov correction-prediction process with an
n-day interval trained Markov matrix to determine price trends. Its final mean
profit comes to 1.670 million. This outperforms the results of experiment five,
which uses a Markov prediction with an n-day interval trained Markov matrix
82
to determine price trends. Here we observe the same phenomenon as in ex-
periment five, where the n-day interval matrix performs worse than the 1-day
repeated Markov matrix. The most likely reason again is that we interpolated
the predicted prices in between linearly and they might not have a linear form.
We are currently working on an implementation where we use matrices for all
days in the planning horizon.
8. Experiment number eight uses an exponential smoother regime lookup predictor
to determine the order probability and median prices as well as to determine the
future price trends. It has a final mean profit of 1.545 million. The exponentially
smooth look-up regime process works well for determining the current day order
price distribution, but has a price divergence that is too large at the end of the
planning horizon.
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Mean Profit / Standard Deviation (in million)
Experiment # 1 2 3 4 5
Strategic: Price-Follower Regimes (MP 1-Day) Combo Regimes (MP 1-day) Regimes (MP n-day)
Tactical: Linear Linear Linear Regimes (ExpS) Regimes (ExpS)
Agent:
TacTex06 8.752/5.682 8.873/5.600 8.399/5.173 9.205/5.385 9.061/5.331
DeepMaize06F 8.839/4.629 8.713/4.846 8.403/4.710 8.318/4.181 8.652/4.865
PhantAgent06 8.049/5.422 7.991/5.384 7.895/5.326 8.173/5.437 7.953/5.247
Maxon06F 4.243/4.516 3.767/4.288 3.808/4.254 4.019/4.181 3.945/4.396
MinneTAC 1.347/3.703 1.813/4.017 1.780/4.536 2.117/3.764 1.567/3.796
Rational05 0.739/4.912 0.669/4.692 0.710/4.692 1.305/4.527 1.115/4.682
Table 6.4: Experimental setup with controlled market conditions and different variations of MinneTAC for order probability,
price and price trend predictions. Mean profit and standard deviation results are based on 23 games per set of experiments.
Regime MP 1-day stands for regime prediction using a 1-day Markov transition matrix, Regime MP n-day uses the n-day
interval Markov transition matrix, and Regime ExpS does regime prediction via an exponential smoother lookup process.
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Mean Profit / Standard Deviation (in million)
Experiment # 6 7 8
Strategic: Regimes (MCP 1-day) Regimes (MCP n-day) Regimes (ExpS)
Tactical: Regimes (ExpS) Regimes (ExpS) Regimes (ExpS)
Agent:
TacTex06 9.039/5.075 9.311/5.203 9.302/5.343
DeepMaize06F 8.648/4.521 8.515/4.488 8.921/4.733
PhantAgent06 8.082/5.126 7.966/4.940 8.029/5.425
Maxon06F 3.988/3.976 4.138/4.381 4.214/4.628
MinneTAC 1.889/3.740 1.670/3.867 1.545/3.898
Rational05 1.211/4.346 0.668/4.440 1.032/4.898
Table 6.5: Experimental setup with controlled market conditions and different variations of MinneTAC for order probability,
price and price trend predictions. Regime MCP stands for regime prediction via a Markov correction-prediction process,
and 1-day or n-day refer respecitivey to using the 1-day or n-day Markov transition matrix.
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We used the Wilcoxon signed rank test [Gibbons, 1986, Hollander and Wolfe, 2000]
to assess statistical significance between the first four experiments. This is a non-
parametric test of the difference between the medians of two samples that does not
require the samples to come from normal (or even the same) distribution. We focused
on the first four experiments because they constitute improvements steps over the
original method, while the other experiments test the effects of variations in the
price-trend prediction method based on regimes. The Wilcoxon signed rank test is
used to test whether the median of a symmetric population is 0. First, the data
are ranked without regard to sign. Second, the signs of the original observations are
attached to their corresponding ranks. Finally, the one sample z statistic (mean /
standard error of the mean) is calculated from the signed ranks.
Test # 1: Exp 4 - Exp 1 2: Exp 4 - Exp 2 3: Exp 4 - Exp 3 4: Exp 2 - Exp 1
α = 0.05 p h srank p h srank p h srank p h srank
All 0.0138 1 57 0.1137 0 86 0.3155 0 105 0.0727 0 79
Positive 0.0054 1 13 0.2769 0 40 0.7615 0 54 0.0256 1 21
Negative 0.4258 0 15 0.4258 0 15 0.4961 0 16 0.9102 0 21
Table 6.6: Wilcoxon signed rank test of equality of medians. The test were performed
at a significance level of α = 0.05 based on 23 data points. p represents the p-value,
h is the result of the hypothesis test, srank contains the value of the signed rank
statistic.
In Table 6.6 we show the results of the Wilcoxon test. Rejecting the null hypothesis
means the medians from the two different samples are different. p is the probability
of observing a result equally or more extreme than the one using the data (from both
samples) if the null hypothesis is true. If p is near zero, this casts doubt on this
hypothesis. The field “srank” contains the value of the signed rank statistic.
We performed the tests on the set of all games, on only positive profit games, and on
only negative profit games. As a result of these tests we observe that the configuration
of experiments four and two, and four and three are not significantly different, and we
cannot reject the null hypothesis. On the other hand we find significant differences
between the outcome of experiments four and one. We are able to reject the null
hypothesis of equal median for the set of all games and the set of all positive games,
but not for the set of negative games. The most likely reason why we are not able
to reject the null hypothesis of equal median for the set of negative games is that
in negative games an agent is more concerned with controlling cost than making
profit and so the differences between the configuration is not much apparent. We
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are also able to show significance between the experiments two and one for the set
of all positive games. Although we could not reject the null hypothesis for the set
of all games at α = 0.05 significance level with a p-value of 0.0726, we are able to
reject the null hypothesis for the set of all games at α = 0.1 significance level. We
believe that the test would likely show significance with a larger sample size. With
this we have shown statistical significance between the original configuration and
the regime/regime configuration. Our results also suggests that the regime/regime
configuration performs better than the linear/regime configuration, although we need
more data to show that conclusively.
6.3 Financial markets
In the following we present an application of the regime method to the stock market
domain. An investor could use this to decide whether to keep his stocks, to buy
more, or to sell in time to make a profit. We define that in financial markets regime
R1 represents a more bearish signal, as opposed regime R5 which represents a more
bullish signal. We have done these experiments on different stocks, but present here
the General Electric, GE, stock as an example of many. We are not claiming that
this works better than other time series prediction methods, this is just a proof of
concept on data outside of the TAC SCM domain.
6.3.1 Experimental setup
Stock market prices are characterized by a time series, and when we perform the
regime training we need to pick a continuous price stream, as opposed to TAC SCM
where we randomly pick training games of a pool of games. We obtained the stock
market data from the Yahoo finance6 service.
The left side of Figure 6.13 displays the time series of our training price data from
October 1st 2005 until December 31st 2005 and the right side shows the appropriate
GMM. For these experiments we use a GMM with 20 Gaussians.
Figure 6.14 (left) shows the learned regime probabilities over price. We experimented
with different number of regimes on different stocks and found that 5 regimes results
in the highest success-rate of price trend predictions. Figure 6.14 (right) displays the
6Yahoo finance: http://finance.yahoo.com/
87
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
32.5
33
33.5
34
34.5
35
35.5
36
36.5
Time [Days]
Pr
ic
e 
[$]
Mid−range Price
Smoothed Price
31 32 33 34 35 36
0
1000
2000
Am
ou
nt
 s
to
ck
 p
ric
e 
ob
se
rv
ed
Price in $
GMM − ge − 2005Oct1−2005Dec31
0
0.2
p(n
p)
0.1
0.3
Product Quantity
p(np)
Figure 6.13: General Electric: Historical prices from Oct 1st 2005 until Dec 31st 2005
(left) and the appropriate GMM (right).
time series of our testing set. We recorded historical prices from January 1st 2006
until September 26th 2006. We calculate the price limits of the GMM as follows:
price limitGMMmax = max((priced +∆price), highest price in training data) (6.9)
price limitGMMmin = min((priced −∆price), lowest price in training data) (6.10)
where priced is the average stock price for the current day and ∆price is the biggest
price difference over continuous intervals of the length of the planning horizon over
the training set.
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Figure 6.14: General Electric: Learned regime distributions (left) and test data from
Jan 1st 2006 until Sep 26th 2006 (right).
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6.3.2 Off-line results
Figure 6.15 (left) shows the real testing price data, the exponential smoother predic-
tions, and the Markov predictions using a repeated 1-day Markov transition matrix.
The right side of Figure 6.15 displays the Markov predictions using a N-day interval
Markov transition matrix.
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Figure 6.15: Price prediction based on 1-day (left) vs n-day (right) trained Markov
matrix.
Finally Figure 6.16 visualizes the success-rate of price trend predictions using a 1-day
(left) and a n-day (right) Markov transition matrix. We observe that here, the same
as in TAC SCM, using a n-day Markov matrix leads to a higher success rate in terms
of price trend predictions for the overall distribution.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
We have presented an approach for identifying and predicting market conditions in
markets for durable goods. We have demonstrated the effectiveness of our approach
using games played in the semi-finals and finals from TAC SCM 2005 and on a
controlled server environment, and showed initial research on stock market data. An
advantage of the proposed method is that it works in any market for durable goods,
since the computational process is completely data driven and that no classification
of the market structure (monopoly vs competitive, etc) is needed.
7.1 Contributions
Our approach recognizes that different market situations have qualitative differences
that can be used to guide the strategic and tactical behavior of an agent. Unlike
regression-based methods that try to predict prices directly from demand and other
observable factors, our approach recognizes that prices are also influenced by non-
observable factors, such as the inventory positions of other agents. Our approach
learns the dynamics and durations of different regimes, and when to expect a shift in
the dominant regime. This is important information that is difficult to represent with
regression-based methods. For example, regression in an expanding market (where
prices increase) will extrapolate increasing prices using the slope of recent price data.
On the other hand, the regime approach can learn that expansion (or scarcity) regimes
are typically limited in duration and predictably followed by other regimes. When
prices are increasing, it is more important to know if prices will fall by the end of
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the planning horizon, which can be invaluable information for a decision maker. Our
method can enable an agent to anticipate and prepare for regime changes, for example
by building up inventory in anticipation of better prices in the future or by selling in
anticipation of an upcoming oversupply situation.
7.2 Future directions
Our approach maintains the uncertainty in price prediction by maintaining a price
distribution. This allows an agent to avoid over-committing to risky decisions. We
intend to apply our method in other domains where predicting price distributions
appears fruitful, including domains such as Amazon.com, eBay.com, and to further
deepen our research in financial applications like stock tracking and forecasting.
We have implemented the regime identification and prediction method in a TAC
SCM agent and integrated it into the overall decision making process. Currently we
are using regime predictions for tactical and strategic decision making in the sales
component of our agent. Ultimately, we plan to combine probability information
supplied by our method with information about possible consequences of actions to
optimize decision making.
With TAC SCM and the stock market we have presented two applications of our
research. The stock market generates a continuous flow of pricing data, whereas in
TAC SCM we have an artificial start and end. Figure 7.1 shows the minimum and
maximum prices, available in the daily price report, for a typical game, 4260@tac4,
for the low market segment.
We observe that the spread between minimum and maximum prices tends to be
relatively constant for much of the game, but in the last 10 days the minimum and
maximum prices diverge strongly. This is a typical behavior in TAC SCM games,
since unsold inventories have no residual value at the end of the game, and some
agents get very aggressive in attempting to sell it off. We have analyzed the mean,
median, and standard deviation of all prices of all the final games in 2005 TAC SCM
tournament (see Figure 7.2), and found that the price divergence in the last 10 days
is very apparent in the aggregate data. Since the last 10 days of the game do not
appear to exhibit any consistent structure, we are thinking it might be best to apply
a simple linear approximation of the order probability curve to react faster to unseen
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Figure 7.1: 4260tac4 (Final TAC SCM 05) – Minimum and maximum daily prices of
computers sold, as reported during the game every day, and mean price for the low
market segment. The mean price is computed after the game using the game data,
which include complete information on all the transactions.
market conditions.
Based on many games we also found out that the beginning of the game, usually the
first 30 days, has an apparent downward trend. The reason is that all manufacturer
agents start out with nothing in their inventories. Once they have something to offer
they can sell for a high price, since the market is in an extreme scarcity regime. Since
the start effect is quite predictable and the end game effect is hardly predictable we are
considering applying three different models to better determine the order probability.
We have started training a separate GMM for each product for the start phase –
day 1 to day 30 (see Figure 7.2, and one for the mid game – day 20 to day 210 (see
Figure 7.2), and a linear model for the last 10 days of the game. As we can see in
Figure 7.2, high initial prices are reflected in the early GMM through a large density
mass above the point where np = 1.0. Towards the end of the game we hardly see any
prices above 1.0. The reason is that the competition is much stronger after day 30,
i.e. after each agent has enough inventory to respond to the majority of the customer
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Figure 7.3: The price density density function for product 16, p(np), (right y-axis)
estimated by the GMM with 25 components from day 1 to day 30 (left) and from day
21 to day 210 (right). We clearly observe a shift in the distribution.
We have purposely trained the early and middle GMM model with a time overlap,
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since the initial early model might predict after day 20 a too strong price trend
downwards. We have developed a model combiner that takes a transition length
and the start and end times of the different models as input. Both models together
generate weighted predictions, i.e. medians, price trends and order probabilities.
Their weights assignments are linearly reciprocal, i.e. on the first day the early model
has 100% weight and the middle one 0%, after 10% of the transition time, the first
model has 90% and the middle one has 10%, and so on until the end where the first
model has 0% and the middle model has 100%. We plan to thoroughly test and
analyze the model in the near future.
In addition, we plan to apply reinforcement learning [Sutton and Barto, 1998] to
map economic regimes to internal operational regimes and operational regimes to
actions, such as procurement and production scheduling. Under operational regimes
we understand a state which includes which actions to take next while knowing the
current regime and receiving the regime forecast.
There are several improvements to the prediction process we are also pursuing. We
plan to implement a boosting algorithm [Schapire et al., 2002, Stone et al., 2003] to
perform dynamic model selection between the two Markov, the exponential smoother
and potentially other regime predictors. Since the methods might work well for
different time-steps in the planning horizon, we plan to perform boosting for all days
in the planning horizon, which will provide a way to focus on the most successful
predictors during the online use of the algorithm.
We also would like to research the impact of different training models and their
resulting real-time performance. One way to modify the regime training model is to
train one model for all the products in one market segment, and then in real-time the
agent will update all the products in one market segment individually. The reason
is that all the products in one market segment see the same demand level, and we
normalize the prices across products.
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Appendix A
Summary of notation
Symbol Definition
C Set of all available component types
G Set of all goods (product types)
d Current day
Dd,g Customer demand for a good g on day d
Deffd,g Effective customer demand for a good g on day d
Φ Total profit
Ad,g Allocated quota for a good g on day d
F Factory capacity
h Planning horizon
np Normalized price
np Mid-range normalized price
n˜pmin Smoothed minimum normalized price
n˜pmax Smoothed maximum normalized price
n˜p Smoothed mid-range normalized price
α Smoothing coefficient
p(np) Density of the normalized price
GMM Gaussian Mixture Model
N Number of Gaussians of the GMM
p(np|ζi) Density of the normalized price, np, given i-th Gaus-
sian of the GMM
µi Mean of i-th Gaussian of the GMM
σi Standard deviation of i-th Gaussian of the GMM
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P (ζi) Prior probability of i-th Gaussian of the GMM
P (ζi|np) Posterior probability of the i-th Gaussian of the
GMM given a normalized price np
~η(np) N-dimensional vector with posterior probabilities,
P (ζi|np), of the GMM
M Number of regimes
Rk k-th Regime, k = 1, · · · ,M
P(c|r) Conditional probability matrix (N rows and M
columns) resulting from k-means clustering
p(np|Rk) Density of the normalized price np given a regime Rk
P (Rk|np) Probability of regime Rk given a normalized price np
P (order |np) Probability of order given a normalized price np
T Markov transition matrix
Π Stationary distribution of a Markov process
KL(~P (Rˆ)‖ ~P (R)) KL-divergence between the predicted regime proba-
bility distribution and the actual regime probability
distribution
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Appendix B
Parameter determination of a
Gaussian Mixture Model
B.1 Maximum Likelihood
Maximum likelihood estimation [Mitchell, 1997] begins with the mathematical ex-
pression known as a likelihood function of the sample data. Loosely speaking, the
likelihood of a set of data is the probability of obtaining that particular set of data
given the chosen probability model. This expression contains the unknown parame-
ters. Those values of the parameter that maximize the sample likelihood are known
as the maximum likelihood estimates.
B.2 The EM-Algorithm
To calculate the posterior probability P (c|np) Equation 5.9 assumes that we know
the distribution that each training instance came from, and the parameters of the
mixture model. The problem is that we do not know either of these things. Here
we describe how to determine the parameters, µ, σ and prior probability of a GMM
from a data set with the help of an unsupervised clustering method called the EM
algorithm [Dempster et al., 1977].
The EM algorithm does the clustering from a probabilistic perspective. It attaches to
each observation, even training examples, a certain probability of belonging to each
cluster. The EM algorithm presumes that the data are generated from a mixture
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distribution, P . Such a distribution has N components, each of which is a distribution
in its own right. A data point is generated by first choosing a component and then
generating a sample from that component. Let the random variable C denote the
component, with values 1, . . . , N ; then the mixture distribution is given by:
P (x) =
N∑
i=1
{P (x|ci)× P (ci)} (B.1)
where x refers to the values of the attribute for a data point. In our case this corre-
sponds to Equation 5.7 where a mixture of Gaussians is the choice of the components
distributions. In a GMM P (ci) corresponds to the weight of each component, wi,
and P (x|ci) corresponds to the normal distribution N(x;µi,∑i) for each component.
In our specific case we are looking only at the density for a particular parameter,
normalized unit order price np, which collapses the covariance matrix to one element,
σi. For general understanding we keep this description open to the multi-parameter
case.
The underlying idea of the EM algorithm is to pretend that we know the parameters of
the mixture model and then infer the probability that each data point belongs to each
component. In a second step each component is re-estimated to fit the entire data
set with each point weighted by the probability that it belongs to that component.
These two steps are iteratively repeated until the procedure converges to a stationary
values for µi. The GMM parameters are initialized arbitrarily and the following two
steps are iterated:
1. E-step: Compute the probabilities pij = P (ci|xj), the probability that datum
xj was generated by component i. With the help of Bayes’ rule we determine
pij = α×P (xj|ci)×P (ci). The term P (xj|ci) is the probability at xj of the ith
Gaussian, and the term P (ci) is the weight parameter or prior probability for
the ith Gaussian. Define pi =
∑
j pij
2. M-step: Compute the new mean, µi, covariance
∑
i, and component weights,
wi, as follows:
µi ←
∑
j
pij × xj
pi
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∑
i
←∑
j
pij × (xj − µi)× (xj − µi)T
pi
wi ← pi
In the first phase, E-step or expectation step, the algorithm calculates the expected
values pij of the hidden indicator variables Zij, where Zij is 1 if datum xj was gener-
ated by the ith component and 0 otherwise. In the second phase, M-step ormaximiza-
tion step, the algorithm finds the new values of the parameters that maximize the log
likelihood of the data, given the expected values of the hidden indicator variables.
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Appendix C
Optimal number of Gaussians
Inputs:
pnpavg: original normalized price density
maxNumGauss: the maximum number of Gaussians
maxFits: iterations of GMM fitting
NP : set of all normalized prices used for training
numNP : length of NP
Output:
optNumGauss: the optimal number of Gaussians
Process variables:
GMM : Gaussian mixture model
pnpsamp: sampled estimated normalized price density
KL: KL divergence
KLavg: average KL divergence
Process:
1 for comp = 1 until maxNumGauss
2 for fits = 1 until maxFits
3 GMM = Expectation Maximization(NP , comp)
4 pnpsamp = Monte Carlo Sampling(GMM ,numNP)
5 KL(comp, fits) = KL divergence(pnpavg, pnpsamp)
6 end
7 KLavg(comp) = mean(KL(comp))
8 end
9 Index KLmin = min(KLavg)
10 optNumGauss = KLavg(Index KLmin)
11 return optNumGauss
Figure C.1: Algorithm to find the optimal number of Gaussians in a GMM.
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Appendix D
Semi-Markov Process
We hypothesized that regime switches are not exponential (Markov), i.e. the future
depends not only on the present state, but also on the length of time the process has
spent in that state. This requires modeling the regime transition as a semi-Markov
process [Levinson, 1986].
To model this we modify the Markov transition matrix, Tpredict , to be a weighted
sum of two matrices, the steady state matrix Tsteady and the change matrix Tchange .
Tsteady is the M ×M identity matrix, where M is the number of regimes. Tchange is
the Markov transition matrix, which is computed off-line as described earlier.
Tpredict(rt+1|rt) = (1− ω(.))Tsteady + ω(.)Tchange(rt+1|rt) (D.1)
where ω(.) represents the probability of a regime change, and rt represents the current
regime. To compute the value of ω(.), we need to introduce a few variables. We define
∆t as the time since the last regime transition at t0: ∆t = t− t0. We model the time
τi spent in regime Ri before the transition to regime Rj occurs as a random variable
with distribution Fij. τi is estimated from historical data. We hypothesized that
the probability density of τi is dependent on the current regime, Ri, i.e. p(τi|Ri).
We computed the frequency of all values of τi in ascending order and fitted different
distributions. The Gamma distribution, g(t;α, λ) is a reasonable fit to the data. (see
Figure D.1).
The gamma density function, g(t;α, λ), depends on two parameters, α and λ:
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g(t;α, λ) =

λα
Γ(α)
tα−1e−λt for t ≥ 0
0 for t < 0
, (D.2)
where Γ(x) is the gamma function, which is defined as Γ(x) =
∫∞
0 u
x−1e−u du x ≥
0, α > 0, λ > 0. The parameters were fitted separately for each regime using a
maximum likelihood procedure. After applying the fitting procedure we obtained
α2 = 0.5193 and λ2 = 0.0264 for regime R2 in the medium market segment. The
probability of a regime transition ω(r,∆t) from the current regime, r, with respect
to the time ∆t that has elapsed since the last regime transition, t0, is given by:
ω(r = Ri,∆t) =
∫ ∆t
0
p(∆t|r = Ri) d∆t (D.3)
where p(∆t|r = Ri) = g(∆t;αi, λi). Equation D.4 describes a recursive computation
for predicting the posterior distribution of regimes at time t+n days into the future,
where k = n+ 1, for the semi-Markov process.
~P (rt+k|npt−1) =
∑
rt+k−1
. . .
∑
rt−1
~P (rt−1|npt−1) ·
k∏
j=1
Tpredict(rt+j|rt+j−1,∆t+ j − 1) (D.4)
104
When we model the process as a semi-Markov process we obtain in the high market
2989 out of 3184 (i.e. 93.88% success rate), in the mid market 2395 out of 3184 trials
(i.e. 75.22% success rate), and in the low market 2451 out of 3184 trials (i.e. 76.98%
success rate).
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